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ABSTRACT 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has become the key international institution 
regulating intergovernmental relations with respect to trade. As the work of the WTO has 
become more significant and pervasive, its principles and processes have come under 
general and academic scrutiny. This subject will be tackled from a historical, present and 
prospective point of view. In this study the author approaches the regulation of 
international trade by looking at the historical context of the main institutions, and tests 
whether international relations are becoming more rule based. By using the tools of 
regime analysis, the nature of state cooperation can be analysed during the GATT period 
and the WTO period. This dissertation demonstrates the special needs of developing 
countries, also referred to as the South. Accordingly, a critical description and analysis of 
the special treatment afforded to developing countries in the GATT regime is provided as 
basis for comparison. In the final analysis this dissertation considers the nature of 
cooperation, the relevance the concept has to an international organisation and analyses 
various aspects of the WTO regime, in particular, the dispute settlement process. The 
quasi-judicial nature of the process of settling disputes, the author argues, is likely to be 
seen as one of the most important developments of international economic relations in the 
twentieth century. Recent developments, particularly the legal action brought by Brazil 
and African cotton producing countries against American agricultural subsidies, are 
examined in this context. Can the World Trade Organisation be an instrument of justice 
and development in the interests of Developing Countries, and can its dispute settlement 
mechanism help forward this agenda? This paper seeks to evaluate that challenge. Un
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CHAPTER I 
International Economic Relations 
1.1. General Introduction 
The dynamics of international political economy in the 20th Century can be 
understood by looking at two countervailing forces. On the one hand, the competitive 
relations among the capitalist First World (the North), on the other, the efforts of the 
countries of the Third World (the South) to develop their economies. Despite the 
importance placed on political independence and autonomy, the current reality is that 
states continue to engage each other in the international economy, and that this trend will 
continue. These relations in the political economy are thus characterised by both 
competition and cooperation. 
At the level of international institutions, which is the focus of this study, these dynamics 
can be seen in the creation, maintenance and development of the rules governing 
international trade. Doing so raises some questions of interest. Do common principles, 
such as justice or fairness underlie these institutions? Are these rules inherently unfair to 
countries of the South? If so, how, if at all, do these states advance their interests and 
effect desired change? More specifically, why and how do changes to the institution 
influence the competitive and cooperative behaviour of its members? These and other 
questions have been considered from various theoretical perspectives. 1 The current 
tensions in international trade negotiations - drawing attention from ambassadors to 
activists across the world - suggest that the existing institutions are at a crossroads. 
Essentially, the questions raised are about the need or desirability of multilateral decision-
making to deal with global problems, not just in trade but also in a number of related 
1 As discussed in the review of the literature in Chapter 2, the study of international trade relations has been 
looked at in a number of disciplines including law, economics and politics and this has enriched the scope 
of analysis. Based on ethical and moral grounds, the normative argument for the rights of human beings is 
that these should be first and foremost in international politics. Ideas such as human rights reinforce the 
principles of international law as embodied by international organizations like the United Nations, and in 
the broad scope of its aims and activities. 
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areas including, labour, competition, investment, intellectual property and the 
environment. 
Why focus on the South? 
The South potentially can be the engine for growth. As noted by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "A new geography of trade is 
emerging and reshaping the global economic landscape, and the South is gradually 
moving from the periphery of global trade to the centre.,,2 Over the next few decades, the 
economic growth generated by the large developing countries could become a much 
larger force in the world economy than is currently considered. 3 In turn, regional 
neighbours could benefit from growth opportunities and lead to geopolitical shifts. The 
converse, that slower growing countries risk being left behind, is not unlikely, but South-
South cooperation could become a strategy for dynamism, particularly in trade. The 
economic progress of the 'middle powers', and their leadership in multilateral 
international relations, will be critical to how the world economy evolves. This inquiry, 
therefore, aims for a clear understanding of multilateral relations in the institutions 
governing international trade by placing deliberate emphasis on these states of the South. 
How have they defined and pursued their interests? How have they been influenced or 
constrained by international institutions? 
Why focus on Institutions? 
International institutions have come to exist in all areas of international relations -
economic, social and politica1.4 Since 1995, trade relations between states have been 
governed under the agreements instituting the World Trade Organization (WTO). There 
are 149 countries representing about 95% of world trade. The original basis for the WTO 
is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, first signed in 1947, but 
progressively amended by trade diplomats through various negotiation rounds. It is 
widely asserted that states with larger economies have had a greater hand in directing 
2 UNCT AD, Trade and Development Board, Fifty-first session, Geneva 4-15 October 2004. 
3 Brazil, Russia, India, and China are widely seen as key. 
4 James Rosenau, "Organizational proliferation in a Changing World," in Issues in Global Governance (UN 
Commission on Global Governance, 1995). 
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these proceedings, and, unsurprisingly, according to their own estimation of national 
interests and political and economic objectives. 
The most important economic objective of the GA ITfWTO agreements is removing 
barriers to trade, such as tariffs, so that all states may enjoy the benefits of free trade. 
According to classical economic theory, aggregate welfare is maximized as states 
specialize in goods and services where their production is most efficient, as determined 
by an open market, and where they hold a comparative advantage. The free market is the 
most effective means for organizing economic relation as the price mechanism operates 
to ensure mutual gain.5 The international trade regime is therefore one of liberal free 
trade. On the basis of economic principle therefore, the WTO is a continuation of the 
GAIT regime. There are however a number of areas where the WTO differs substantially 
from the GAIT. Primarily, these are to do with the extent to which the trade system has 
moved away from being a power-based system to one that is law-based. 6 Such an 
evolution towards a rule of law, if indeed this is the case, is a significant expansion for 
the regime governing international trade. This study aims to explore these differences and 
their affect. The focus is on the dispute resolution mechanisms put in place in order to 
accommodate and resolve conflicts. 
1.2. The Research Question 
Virtually all countries now engage each other multilaterally and consider the 
beneficial potential of international trade as key to their domestic development. What is 
less clear is whether economic relations between states with equal sovereignty can be 
regulated by international law or whether power politics will continue to determine 
winners and losers. 
5 Theoretical conclusions about the benefits of free trade are not empirically tested. In the series of political 
negotiations about trade barriers, the starting premise has been that reducing these barriers is a cost for 
which states therefore need compensation from others. This runs counter to the purely economic argument 
that removing barriers to trade is beneficial regardless of the actions of others. 
6 Meinhard Hilf, "Power, Rules and Principles - Which Orientation for WTOIGATI Law?" Journal of 
International Economic Law (200 I): 111-134. 
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Comparing the GATT and the WTO and examining the effects of the 
'legalization' of international trade raises some interesting questions for political 
scientists.7 This inquiry asks: Do the changes to the institutions governing trade present 
those states considered economically weak and historically exploited, with new foreign 
policy choices? Two aspects are considered here: First, the 'Agenda-setting' capability 
of states. Second, the use of formalised dispute settlement procedures. Tn this context, this 
study considers whether the creation of the WTO has led to more effective multilateral 
cooperation on trade issues between states of the South, than was the case during GATT. 
If this is so, does this indicate a significant change in the type of choices, decisions and 
behaviour states engage in, in their international trade relations? 
1.3. Concepts 
Cooperation between political actors has proved to be as elusive to realize as to 
analyse in international relations. Robert Keohane, a major theoretician in the field of 
international political economy frankly admits "no sensible person would choose it as a 
topic of investigation on the grounds that its puzzles could readily be 'solved",.8 Partly, 
this is because policymakers view cooperation less as an end in itself than a means to 
other objectives. For our purposes, it is necessary to identify what kinds of behaviour 
counts as cooperation. The first assumption is that of rationality - each actor's behaviour 
is directed toward some goal, though this need not be identical. The second dimension is 
that of self-interest - each actor helps other actors realize their goals in the anticipation of 
achieving its own ends. In contrast, conflict implies behaviour where states seek actively 
to reduce the gains of others, often, but not always, acting unilaterally. Cooperation 
however, should not be viewed as the absence of conflict. As Keohane argues, "Without 
the spectre of conflict, there is no need to cooperate.,,9 
7 One is a conceptual question about the emphasis on the anarchy-order dichotomy in the international 
system as a fundamental concept. Another whether this heralds a supranational or an "imperial state" in the 
making, as some suggest. What are the implications for our understanding of concepts such as state 
sovereignty and autonomy? See, for example B. S. Chimni, "International Institutions Today: An Imperial 
Global State in the Making," European Journal of International Law, 15:1 (2004): 1-37. 
8 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Econom.v (Princeton: 
New Jersey, 1984) p.IO. 
9 Keohane, 1984: 54. 
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This observation is particularly applicable to international trade. In the international 
political economy, trade relations are cooperative and conflictual. Historically states have 
sought to damage each other's economies to gain resources for themselves by waging war 
and manipulating foreign trade. But even the most power-oriented states recognize the 
potential advantage from mutual restraint in the common interest. When the costs 
outweigh the benefits, governments engage in international negotiations in order to limit 
potential conflict. 
International cooperation in trade relations has in most instances been under the 
protection of one state, the hegemon. Such a state meets two conditions: it is both 
"powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and 
willing to do SO,,10 While the theory of hegemonic stability is not the focus of this study, 
an understanding of the cooperative political economy under American leadership is 
crucial when examining the emergence of the liberal trade regime. 
The concept of regime is understood as more than merely the prevailing order or system, 
because it also implies prescribed behaviour. John G. Ruggie, in introducing the concept, 
identified this dimension and is a useful starting point.!! Stephen Krasner's definition 
extends the institutional aspect, and is therefore helpful in the context of this study12. 
Krasner defines a regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures around which actors' expectation converge in any given area of 
international relations.,,13 Regimes therefore are examples of cooperative behaviour, and 
also facilitate cooperation.!4 In the area of international trade, the multilateral agreements 
10 Robert Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman, 1977/1989) p.44. Keohane (1984) argues cooperation can continue after hegemony. 
11 John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983). 
12 This, and other critical views of regime theory, primarily that of Susan Strange (1982) are considered in 
detail below in 2.3.2. 
13 Stephen D. Krasner, "International Regimes," International Organization, 36:2 (1982). 
14 Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 
41:3 (1987). The authors argue that regimes may unintentionally contribute to instability, citing the collapse 
of Bretton Woods exchange markets. 
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of the GATT treaty and the WTO constitute the norms and principles, and at the same 
time also the international organizations of the trade regime. This paper focuses on 
investigating the evolution of the norms and rules of trade relations over time; the 
concept of international regime provides the basis of comparison to explore continuity 
and change in the political economy. IS 
1.4. Theory 
The WTO will be read in the light of international relations theory pertaining to 
international regimes. Of course, a regime - whether understood as a set of rules, or 
rights and duties of states - is not sufficient in explaining state behaviour primarily 
because it does not properly account for the extent to which state behaviour is, in fact, 
rule governed. This is a central theme of the theoretical debate in international relations 
and merits further explanation. A simplified version of the debate is based on the 
antagonism between Realist and Idealist traditions. The realist view is that institutions are 
merely reflections of state power and interests. Powerful states create, and often choose to 
ignore international rules. In contrast, the liberal view is that institutions have an 
independent role in resolving collective action problems. International organizations 
based on international law thus both limit and empower states. The theoretical context of 
this study centres on how the realist (power) and liberal (institutionalist) explanations 
explain the international trade regime. 
One of the underlying notions is of the trade organisation as an area of interaction 
between member states rather than as an independent actor. The level of analysis 
therefore is the international or systemic level, rather than looking at domestic 
explanations for state behaviour. Changes at the system level, particularly in institutions 
governing the trade regime, are external constraints and motivators for state behaviour. 
How has state interaction evolved? How does state behaviour differ under GATT and 
WTO rules and how can one analyse these changes? The hypothesis offered is that the 
degree of institutionalisation in international trade can be measured as the move from 
1'\ Keohane, 1984: 64. 
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being power-based to being rule-based. Actors can respond in different ways because of 
the changes in the institutional structure. With a move toward rule-based relations, 
governed by international law, the institutions governing trade give states in the South a 
new approach to cooperation and conflict in international trade relations. Such a view as 
presented here tests the null hypothesis from the Realist approach, which emphasises 
formal anarchy and therefore is concerned with ranking relative power as the independent 
variable, and the Structuralist one, where the behaviour of states is determined by the 
international economic system. 
1.5. Scope, methodology and an outline of chapters 
The starting premise, based on observation of international trade negotiations is 
that there exists a discord between nations of the North and South. The basic argument is 
that while the institutions of international trade seek to promote economic growth and 
wealth creation, the distribution of advantages have accrued to an economic elite and 
excluded the majority of the South. In answering the question - whether the creation of 
the WTO has positively affected cooperation on trade issues compared to during the 
GAIT period - a historical institutional perspective is appropriate. 
Chapter 2 begins by placing the debate within the theoretical context of International 
Relations, and after reviewing the relevant literature sets the parameters of this study 
more precisely within International Political Economy. Attention is given to studies on 
firstly, the nexus of the state and the market, secondly, the character of global 
interactions, and thirdly, the prospects for cooperation and development. 
The starting point of the comparative aspect of the study is whether the international 
institutions affect the decisions states make. The options open to states participating in a 
regime are limited by the norms, principles and rules of the institutions to specific types 
of decisions and actions. As the trade relations (like most interstate relations) over time 
become more rule-based and more institutionalised, the expectation is that 'weaker' but 
equally sovereign states can and will use the provisions available to them. If this is the 
10 
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case, it should be evident in areas of conflicting interests, therefore the need to look at 
dispute resolution and at one of the most contentious topics, agriculture trade. 
More specifically, the power-based relations under GATT (1947 -1994) are compared to 
the rule-based relations of the WTO (1995-2005). The norms, principles, rules and 
decision-making structures of each are compared. The historical approach is necessary to 
compare and understand the important changes to the regime over time. The North-South 
issues under GATT and under the WTO are also compared. The focus is not on 
diplomatic bargaining or negotiation but rather on outcomes. The analysis shows that 
states are constrained by the possible remedy institutions are able to offer. The GATT 
offered only limited remedy, so states of the South, through the Group of 77 (G77) bloc, 
looked outside GATT to UNCTAD and the UN, with variable success. The WTO dispute 
settlement system offers states a legal or quasi-judicial route (though international law 
has its limitations) that GATT did not. In the WTO regime there are modest but 
significant victories, and the case brought by Brazil against American subsidies on cotton 
production is used as an illustrative example. 
The sections that follow review the creation of an international trading regime, by 
looking at the law and main institutional features of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in Chapter 3 and, the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Chapter 4. 
In a comparative method, each chapter considers the relevant context of the international 
system, the actions and behaviour of developing countries, and evaluates in conclusion 
the efficacy of their cooperation. The final section, Chapter 5, advances arguments for 
analysing cooperation within and outside institutions and returns to the implications this 
has for theory. 
11 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
CHAPTER 2 
The Research Agenda of International Political Economy 
2.1. Theoretical Considerations 
Most writings on inter-state relations are rooted in a theoretical understanding of 
the international order. After surveying the main debates, contrasting between theories 
that seek to evaluate international order and those that emphasise international anarchy, 
the focus is on theories that consider the reciprocal influence of economic and political 
factors. The theoretical framework of political economy is then defined by looking at the 
state and economic development, and the debate on the nature of an international liberal 
economy. Throughout, but particularly in the final section, the issues of developing 
countries in the international political economy are explored via the literature. The study 
of international order and an international trade regime, are placed in terms of neoliberal 
institutionalism. In conclusion, recent studies from the perspective of international 
economic law are considered. 
2.1.1. The international system of states: From Anarchy to Interdependence 
Broadly, in International Relations theory, two currents of thought are seen as 
traditions: the 'Realist stream' where power, the balance of power and state interest are 
considered as key organizing concepts; and the 'Idealist stream' that looks at institutions 
and their judicial-legal basis on the international sphere. 16 
Political realism is grounded on an emphasis on power politics with the sovereign state as 
principal actor. 17 Since there is no higher authority than the sovereign state, and states are 
in competition with one another, international politics is determined to be anarchic. Hans 
J. Morgenthau, an influential Realist, contends, "all history shows that nations active in 
16 Hedley Bull looks at competing traditions: "the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international 
politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a 
political community of mankind" and adds a third, the Grotian tradition "which views international politics 
a staking place within an international society." Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Stud.v of Order in 
World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977) p.23. 
17 The antecedents of the tradition are traced from Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hobbes and 
Clausewitz to twentieth century Realists such E.H. Carr (1939) and Morgenthau (1948). 
12 
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international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering 
from organized violence in the form ofwar.,,18 The realist assumption is of states as 
coherent actors, prepared to use military force in achieving power. States able to meet 
their basic needs, survival and independence, also may possess the ability to influence 
other states, and in pursuing their own interests bring a hierarchy to international 
relations. In contrast, Systemic realism - sometimes called structural realism or neo-
realism - emphasizes the distribution of power among states within an international 
system as the principal determinant of state behaviour. 19 
The Realist primacy of the state means cooperation is explained as the convergence of 
self-interest, whether states enter a temporary alliance or accept a more permanent 
organization. Thus any international organization can only be as effective as the most 
powerful states permit them to be. Even if one were to accept the existence of anarchy as 
predominant, structural anarchy does not mean that international politics is characterized 
by conflict. States do cooperate with one another and do create rules and institutions in 
many areas. 
The Idealist tradition is historically based on a belief in universal values, not the 
autonomous nation-state. The emphasis therefore is on internationalism. In the tradition 
of Immanuel Kant, as Hedley Bull explains, the nature of international politics lies in the 
"trans-national bonds that link the individual human beings who are the subjects or 
citizens of states".20 Liberal theory, for example, is based on the belief that the universal 
rights of the individual, such as human rights, have a higher status than the sovereignty of 
the nation-state. 21 For the Idealist school, the international system of states, particularly in 
the contemporary one, relations are based on cooperation, collective security and, 
increasingly, internationallaw.22 
18 Morgenthau (1967) quoted in Keohane and Nye (1977: 175) 
19 The main theoretical argument for the systemic version is Kenneth Waltz's influential Theory of 
International Politics (1979). See also Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1981). 
20 Bull, 1977: 24. 
21 Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics (Basingstoke: Pal grave Macmillan, 2001) p. 140. 
22 The work ofInis L. Claude (1964), and John Burton (1972) can be considered as examples. 
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Liberal democratic theorists maintain that there can be a harmony of interests among 
democratic states. Since the end of the Second World War, it is argued, there is evidence 
that the liberal world order based on shared common interest results in cooperation, 
which in turn leads to peace and development. 23 Three key points are worth expanding 
on. 
Firstly, the acceptance and spread of democratic political systems reduces the influence 
of elite interests and authoritarianism, and as Woodrow Wilson argued was the best 
defence against war. 24 Secondly, the acceptance and codification of international law 
contributes to the peaceful settlement of disputes. 25 In looking at international 
institutions, this judicial legal emphasis is important and of relevance of to this thesis. 
Thirdly, and as explained below, the cost for states to resort to conflict is high, because 
the expansion of the international economy through trade has resulted in relations of 
economic interdependence. This connection between interdependence and international 
order deserves scrutiny. The Realist position, that in relative terms some states are more 
powerful than others, still holds. As does the view that it is under the aegis of the most 
dominant state that there is the necessary protection for international order.26 The debate 
in the literature is assessed in section 2 under theories of hegemonic stability, comparing 
realist interpretations with a liberal institutionalist perspective. 
It is particularly useful to consider the work of Keohane and Nye.27 For the authors in 
1967, the traditional approaches could not adequately explain the changes then occurring 
in world politics. Instead of state-state relations, they argued, there were multiple 
channels connecting societies called "transnational relations". Instead of resort to force, 
23 The point that even where common interests exist, cooperation often fails is noted. 
24 Wilson's observation was that democracies do not fight each other. 
25 This is not only evidently true in international organizations like the United Nations, based on collective 
security to prevent war, but also in other areas where disputes may arise. such as demarcation of 
international waters. Keohane makes the observation that "Institutionalist writers have always stressed that 
cooperation can be fostered by institutions" (Keohane, 1984: 66). 
26 Indeed, such a situation existed under American predominance following the Second World War: the 
nuclear umbrella, the Marshall plan to Europe, and arguably, the economic links largely as a result of the 
dollarization of the world economy. 
27 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 
1977/1989). Also, Joseph S Nye and Robert o. Keohane, eds. Transnational Relations and World Politics. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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nuclear deterrence made military action complex. Instead of a narrow definition of 
security, economic issues and their implication for domestic and foreign policy were 
central to definition of national interest. These characteristics of the changes in 
international politics were defined as "complex interdependence". Keohane and Nye, 
writing more recently in 2000, consider the legitimacy of international institutions, 
particularly of the WTO, as a vital aspect of international political economy. Comparing 
the early and later work shows that "complex interdependence" was a challenge to the 
Realist paradigm but was also the basis for a new approach to international relations. 28 
2.1.2. The International Political Economl9 
Benjamin Cohen's survey of literature on the international political economy in 
1990, looking at Robert Gilpin, David A. Lake, Richard Rosencrance, Helen Milner and 
John Conybrae, identified two broad sets of questions.3o One set has to with system 
management and the consequences of economic interdependence. The other set with 
actor behaviour, particularly government action as representative of sovereign nation 
states.31 Recent work in the field of the politics of trade explores the link between 
domestic actors, particularly elites, and their influence on international policy.32 Much of 
this is based on the work of James Rosenau on 'linkage politics' and also Robert 
Putnam's model of two level games, which integrates domestic politics with international 
28 As Peter Gourevitch put it to the American Political Science Association (APSA) it was "no less than the 
foundation for a new subfield, international political economy." Accessed online at 
(http://www.apsanet.orgIPS/sept99/keohane.cfm) 
29 The integration of the economic and the political was a transition in understanding world politics but 
begs the question of why their study was separate in the first place. Writing in the 1970s about the 
transformation of foreign policy, Edward L. Morse concluded, 'The purely political and purely economic 
cannot be seen as empirically separahle". Edward L Morse, Modernization and the transformation of 
International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976). Richard Cooper's The Economics of 
Interdependence (1968) and Charles Kindleberger's Power and Money (1970) made similar claims in 
economics. Such a claim in political science necessarily relies on the definition of complex 
interdependence and the innovation of Keohane and Nye's early work. 
30 Benjamin]. Cohen, "The Political Economy of International Trade," International Organization 44:2 
(1990). 
31 Studies of organizational decision making, bureaucratic theories and misperception are in this category. 
32 See for example, Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations," World Politics, 
44 (1992): 466-496. 
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relations theory. The determinants of international economic relations therefore are to be 
found within a spectrum of state interventionism and of global market forces. 33 
The common theme in the IPE literature explores the usefulness of distinctions between 
domestic and foreign as a result of interdependence. Morse makes an analytic distinction 
between foreign policy and domestic policy.34 Foreign policy is oriented to some actual 
or potential sphere external to the jurisdiction of the state, while domestic policy is 
oriented to some sphere within the jurisdiction of the state. There is also a difference in 
the ends and means of each. Foreign policy goals represent the national interest as 
opposed to particular interests. While in foreign policy any means can be used to achieve 
the ends, domestic policy requires a level of legitimacy. Morse's principal observation is 
that as societies and states become more modernized there is economic and political 
integration, creating high levels of interdependence. The effect is a blurring of the 
domestic order with the international one. 
Robert Gilpin (1981) is broadly in agreement.35 He argues that the economic and foreign 
policies of a society reflect the national interest as defined by the dominant elite of that 
society. The elite is the governing political elite, but also includes the powerful groups 
that exert pressure within society. Writing in 1992, Gilpin ventured, "the clash between 
domestic autonomy and international norms has become of central importance.,,36 In a 
later work, Gilpin considers the purpose of economic activity as a fundamental issue in 
the study of political economy since it determines the role of the market in the economy. 
Gilpin asks whether the purpose of economic activity is to benefit individual consumers, 
to promote social welfare goals, or to maximize national power?37 This is similar to the 
view of Keohane, who sees the process as one of a "Trade off between the long-term 
D Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
34 Morse, 1976. 
3-' Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
36 See Stephan et ai, The Scramble for Africa in the 21" century (Cape Town: Stephan Phillips, 2006) p.225 
37 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 200 1). 
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pursuit of the interest of the state and the short-term partial economic interests of 
influential merchants, workers, manufacturers or farmers.,,38 
In every society, the goals of economic activities and the role of markets in achieving 
those goals are determined by political processes. Delving into the domestic political 
dimension too closely for the determinants of international action does however present 
some theoretical problems. The main one can be explained as the problem of 'level of 
analysis'. Kenneth Waltz (1959) introduced the distinction of three levels of analysis: 
international-level (or systemic), domestic level and individual level explanations for 
state behaviour. As J. David Singer explains, if there is to be cumulative growth in the 
theory the different levels must be seen as mutually exclusive. More recently, two-Ievel-
games theorists focus primarily on integrating international and domestic levels, though 
are concerned with all three. Robert Putnam observes that "domestic politics and 
international relations are somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out 
the puzzling tangle.,,39 
Susan Strange considers precisely the ability to shape the system level of analysis in her 
approach to structural power. Structural power is defined as "the power to shape and 
determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their 
political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientist and other 
professional people have to operate,,40 The international system thus is composed of four 
global structures of security, production, finance and knowledge. As Strange explains the 
consequences of structural change has implications for developing countries.41 
Having thus considered the most relevant literature in IPE, this study limits the scope of 
the domestic dimension; placing the systemic explanations under scrutiny. The domestic 
dimension in the North where trade policy and agriculture policy have international 
repercussions is the starting point of the analysis. These policy aspects are less important 
38 Keohane, 1984: 23. 
39 As cited by Stephan et aI, p.224. 
40 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988) pp. 24-25. 
41 Susan Strange and John M. Stopford. Rival State, Rival Firms: Competition for world market shares 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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than the international level interaction where states over time attempt to shape the 
international system. The assumption that the rules of the international system work 
against the interests of the poor or least powerful must also be tested at the systemic level. 
In the historical analysis, regardless of variance in domestic actors, states of the 
developing world base their justifications on their rights as sovereign states and seek twin 
goals of economic development and political independence. The way in which they do so, 
it is argued, is by cooperation at the international level with similar states - states of the 
South. 
As is explored below in terms of the production structure, it is increasingly difficult for 
states of the South to opt out of the international system. Does this mean that these states 
are unable to modernize and develop autonomously in their own best interest? The 
section that follows examines questions of state sovereignty and autonomy, by tracing the 
various paths of 'development'. Both the theoretical context and state practice are 
considered. 
2.2. IPE: theory and practice 
Theory on the direction of political and economic change rested on the 
assumptions of the course of 'modernization' and 'development' of the early European 
nation states. Initially academic studies in political development focussed on the western 
model as a universal model and were premised on a dichotomy between the 'traditional' 
and the 'modem' .42 The basic tenet of modernization theory is that societies undergo a 
universal process of development.43 
42 Migdal (1983) surveys the principal contributions of Rostow (1960) Almond and Coleman (1960) Tilly 
(1975), Evans (1979), and Frank (1981) amongst others. Basically. as a country develops, the social 
structure becomes complex, new groups emerge and organize. Industrialization leads to urbanization, 
differentiation of the social structure, education, emergence of the middle class, attenuation of class 
cleavages, and eventually political participation. 
43 S.M. Lipset, in his influential 1960 book Political Man, argues a link between development and 
democracy and concludes that most poor countries were ruled by dictatorships, while all affluent countries 
had democratic regimes. 
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Ultimately, since it is a prerequisite for a socialist ideal, societies will develop to the 
capitalist mode of production stage.44 This, in turn, will give rise to competing classes 
and to the political relations that lead to the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. 
These assumptions and conclusions of theories of international political economy need 
deeper analysis. Following Robert Gilpin's classification, the three major perspectives 
economic nationalism or Mercantilism, Marxism, and liberalism are considered.45 These 
broad perspectives are a useful starting point. They not only offer a historical trajectory 
explaining the contemporary political economy but also advance the actions required to 
achieve economic development. Each is examined in turn. 
2.2.1. Theoretical/ideological perspectives: Mercantilist, Liberal, and Marxist 
The mercantilist perspective explains the success of colonial powers, and 
hegemons like Great Britain and the USA, based on the premise that a strong national 
economy is a necessary basis for a powerful state.46 From this Realist approach 
governments can (and indeed should) manipulate economic arrangements to maximize 
their own interests, even if doing so is at the expense of others. Understood in this way, 
the process of development is also that of nation building: economic nationalism builds 
economic power, security and independence, relative to other states.47 Moreover, it is 
argued that there is a requirement for a state to protect itself from increasing competition. 
The bottom line is that there is a substantial developmental role for the state in the 
economy. From the 1960s onwards, influential development economists like Argentinean 
Raul Prebisch advised developing countries to pursue a protectionist path of 
44 The historical idea of progress through capitalist development was initially widely accepted. Even the 
Marxist view of history, in which the material and economic conditions form the basis of social and 
political structures, is deterministic. (See, for example, Louis Althusser's writings of 1960s on structualist 
Marxism.) 
45 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987). 
46 George Sorenson, The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Mvth of Retreat (London: Macmillan, 
2004) p.13. 
47 Joseph Grieco and John Ikenberry, 'The Political Foundations of the World Economy' in State Power 
and World Markets (New York: WH Norton, 2003) pp. 99-105. 
19 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
industrialisation, and in doing so, resist the liberal options of open markets and full 
integration into the world economy. 48 
The liberal approach emphasises a more limited role for the state in the economy. 
Whereas the mercantilist state sought to drive the process of economic growth, a liberal 
or free market would allow individual enterprises to locate economic activity where it 
would be most productive and profitable. The philosophical basis for this claim is that 
individual's exercising free will to exchange property, goods or services for something 
they value more, can only happen without state interference.49 There is an important role 
for legitimate state authority in providing the legal framework, protecting property rights 
and enforcing contracts in the market. Rather than maintaining independence (or 
dominance) vis a vis other states, international market forces that tend towards integration 
are seen as the main drivers of development. Removing the barriers to the free movement 
of goods and allowing the principle of comparative advantage would not only generate 
absolute gains but also maximize total wealth.5o 
The Marxist critique - that capitalism generates and exacerbates inequality -influenced 
the Structuralist perspective. Radical theorists explained that the history of struggle for 
political self-determination was incomplete as long as economic dependence continued. 
This was a Marxist conception of an exploitative capitalist world order, where power and 
wealth were concentrated in the core while the periphery remained underdeveloped. 
Capitalism, the private ownership of the means of production, concentrates wealth in the 
hands of the efficient few and impoverishes the many. This is the case both in the 
48 Such counsel to emerging states echoed that of the patriotic economic nationalism proposed 120 years 
earlier for European states like Germany, where Friedrich List argued (in 1841) in favour of tariff 
protections for domestic industry. Similarly, in the United States, though much earlier, Alexander Hamilton 
had argued for trade protection and government promotion of important sectors like manufacturing. New 
manufacturers (or infant industries) needed protection from competitive foreign rivals. According to 
Hamilton, for these industries "(t)o be enabled to contend with success, it is evident that the interference 
and aid of their own government are indispensable." Hamilton's Report on the Subject of Manufactures as 
quoted by David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to International Political Economy (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2(01), p.30. See also Amit Bhaduri, "Nationalism and Economic Policy in the Era of 
Globalization" in Deepak Nayyar, ed., Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2(02) p.26. 
49 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) p.163. 
50 Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy ill the 21" Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000) pp. 88-93. 
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domestic economy, where classes are the relevant actors, and among states. As Lenin 
points out in Imperialism, by acquiring colonial territories the capitalist economies 
exploited resources through unequal exchange and also expanded a capitalist economy 
abroad. Since the result would be "uneven development", the international system could 
only be stable for a short period of time. 
Latin American studies on the effects of imperialism note a structural condition of 
dependence. Dependencia theory, for example the work of Andre Gunder Frank, argues 
that imperialism produced underdevelopment and dependence. As Theotonio dos Santos 
explains, the era of colonial dependence is succeeded by financial-industrial dependence 
and, as is the case currently, dependence on multinational corporations. The expansion of 
the capitalist system is accompanied by a widening of the social divide between those in 
power profiting from the new modes of production and exchange, and the mass of poor 
people who bear the brunt of the structural changes. 
Both Realist and Dependency type approaches take power as the most important variable 
in the international system. It is through the relative measure of power that states are 
categorised variously as superpowers, or relegated as core and periphery.51 Whether these 
labels are definitive or empirically accurate is of less importance here than the fact that 
the categorisation is central to the theoretical arguments. While the terms North and 
South have been employed as useful shorthand, both historically and in this study for 
developed and developing countries, no implications at the theoretical level are 
intended.52 The developing countries, especially those with large economies as active 
exporters are considered as new middle powers and representative of the South for the 
purposes of this study. Examining the role of the most powerful, as considered by the 
three perspectives, is also useful. 
51 Such typology is not without controversy. Edward Said's Orientalism or Samuel Huntington's Clash of 
Civilizations are two examples of the categorisation debate along broadly cultural or religious lines. 
52 The UN, World Bank and WTO distinguish between least developed countries, but also countries with 
specific characteristics, such as small island states. The least developed countries are a defined category 
and merit serious study though their specific problems are addressed well from the perspective of 
egalitarian justice. See For example Darrel Moellendorf, "The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian 
Justice", Metaphilosophy, 36, 1 (January 2005). 
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2.2.2. Hegemony 
Each of the theoretical perspectives deals with notions of power either as benign 
leadership or malevolent dominance and seek to explain the role of the most powerful, or 
hegemon, in the international system. 
The radical critique of international economic relations is that, like imperialism53, it is a 
political project aimed at the global management of capital or, put another way, the 
"social reproduction of capitalism".54 The expansionist logic is that in order for national 
capitalism to survive it must continuously expand to exploit new markets and to maintain 
profits.55 The USA, and the leading industrial powers are allied in an international 
capitalist class where global wealth is concentrated. Whether this is desirable can be 
considered as a normative question, but it is clear that the hegemonic state has sufficient 
power and opportunity to organize the world economy.56 
Realists see the American dominance of the international system in terms of power 
politics and the mercantilist impulse of nation states. The rise of hegemony brings 
stability; however, this is followed by decline and eventual war as the balance of power 
shifts. However, since the world economy requires legitimacy there is the incentive not to 
act too coercively.57 The dominant position, over which there is contestation between 
states and blocs of states, permits the hegemon to advance its interests through a number 
of means - including the mechanism of international institutions. 58 
From a liberal view the hegemon provides the international system with public goods of 
security and stability. In Kindleberger's formulation the international liberal economy is 
the public good. Therefore the monetary and financial arrangements, and especially the 
53 Lenin argued that the inevitable collapse of capitalism could be delayed through international expansion. 
(See Balaam and Veseth, 1996: 69) 
54 Roland Axtmann, "The State of the State: The Model of The modem State and its Contemporary 
Transformation," International Political Science Review 25(3), (2004) p.274. 
55 David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) pA. 
56 According to Gilpin, the USA used its military, political, economic and ideological power to organize 
world markets, but also the power of access to its internal market. (See also Grieco and Ikenberry, 
2003:110 -115). 
57 Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003: 115. 
58 Held and McGrew, 2002: 72-4. 
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institutions to regulate them, provide the stability for a liberal trading system. In the 
finance structure the hegemon stabilizes monetary relations by maintaining exchange 
rates, coordinating macroeconomic policies and ensuring liquidity. In the production 
structure a liberal free market is maintained and protectionism minimised. The underlying 
assumption is that capitalism is the only viable system, and the best way to extend the 
benefits of capitalism is through liberalized international trade. This system of global 
economic governance requires a dominant or hegemonic state to establish the structures 
of international organizations. In comparison to the British hegemony of the 19th Century, 
American hegemony entails a "much more systematic use of institutions and explicit 
multilateral rules to establish and maintain economic openness."S9 
Maintaining multilateral agreements is still possible even when the hegemonic power is 
in decline, though much depends on the international regime that is created. The ability to 
establish rules can be considered as an indicator of strength or decline of state power in 
the international system. In Stephen Krasner's view, the stability of the regime depends 
on how accurately it reflects the underlying power structure. When the international 
regime gives too much influence to the less powerful the result could be the collapse of 
the liberal economic regime. 6o John O. Ruggie's work on regimes looks at norm creation 
via institutions as one way that the liberal economic order has endured post-hegemon in 
what is termed 'embedded liberalism'. One aspect is the accountability of states as party 
to international treaties and organizations, which thus acquire law making and law 
enforcement roles. While the development of international regimes, and the institutions 
necessary to make and keep the rules, may be seen as eroding state sovereignty, 
embedded liberalism also suggests that market efficiency and social values can be 
reconciled domestically. There are also arguments, grounded in Kant's cosmopolitan 
theory for the creation of a global order. This cosmopolitan or 'cosmopolitical' idea is 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. Before coming to that, the primacy of the 
nation state as a decision-making unit vis a vis the international order, particularly in 
economic development, must be considered. 
59 Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003: 113. 
60 Craig N. Murphy, "What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of 
the New International Economic Order ideology," International Studies Quarterly, 27: 1 (1983) p. 59. 
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2.2.3. Development Policy Consensus? 
With the discrediting of communist ideology, the relevance of Marxism declined 
and the influence of liberalism was predominant. Dependency theory gave way to 
discussion of economic development and growth strategies, promulgated by the 
institutions governing international economic relations. States achieving independence 
after the Second World War faced an ideological battle between free market capitalism 
and command economy socialism and, in the bipolar world of the Cold War, charged 
with ideological animosity, this was an economic as well as a political statement. Most of 
these newly independent states, like those who had achieved independence earlier, 
adopted policies that tended to be state-driven rather than market-led development 
strategies. From the mid-1980s, the relevance of these perspectives changed dramatically. 
At the level of international institutions, which came to play an increasingly significant 
role, the argument for liberal, or rather neoliberal, development strategies was 
dominant. 61 The logic, on the one hand, was that as national economies became 
integrated, an economic crisis in one state now had potentially devastating consequences 
internationally. On the other hand, if a state were given support by international financial 
institutions, this would be a green light for foreign direct investment. Policy changes, like 
shifting to export-led growth strategies and scaling down the role of the state in the 
economy, were thus presented as necessary to development. The institution governing 
trade relations, the GATT, which like the World Bank and the IMF had initially been at 
the margins, expanded both in terms of membership and in the scope of area regulated. 
Particularly, the principle of free trade was trumpeted. Countries of the South, by seeing 
trade as an opportunity rather than a threat and opening their economies to imports and 
foreign investment, would, it was claimed, follow in the path to economic prosperity. 
61 The World Bank's loans for development went to states accepting conditions of financial responsibility 
and macroeconomic management in line with neoliberal principles. The IMP's Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, for example, were part of a wider set of initiatives to deal with debt burdens and other 
problems of 'weak' economies. 
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Despite the claim for a neoliberal consensus, there was division between the developed 
North and developing South. The various policy recommendations, supported by the 
wealthy countries, came to be seen as a mantra for development and coalesced around the 
prescriptions of a 'Washington Consensus' .62 These were prescriptions for reform not 
only for the transition of post-Communist economies, but also universally relevant for the 
countries of the South. As regards trade, there is scepticism about the net benefits of trade 
liberalization, and also on the distribution of those benefits within and between nations.63 
Robert Gilpin argues that the international rules that govern international economic 
affairs cannot succeed unless supported by a strong political base.64 The benefits of free 
trade in an open and integrated global economy are neither as extensive nor as 
irreversible as many assume. Global capitalism and economic globalization have rested 
and must continue to rest on a secure political foundation. In Gilpin's view, since the end 
of the Cold War, all the political elements that have supported an open global economy 
have considerably weakened. The ability and the willingness of the United States to lead 
has declined. Western Europe, and Japan have emphasized their own regional priorities. 
China as a new economic player is another major factor. The result is weakened political 
foundations of the global economy. 
The theoretical origins of the main arguments described continue to be relevant in 
international political economy. Claims that state sovereignty is under challenge from 
interdependence and the increasing globalisation of economic life continue to be 
prominent, and will feature centrally in future. Today, the debate over economic 
development centres on the appropriate role for 'state' and 'market' in the development 
process. 65 Ngaire Woods, writing in 2000 points out how the increase in interdependence 
could be measured quantitatively (in production, distribution, consumption) but has also a 
62 Benjamin Cohen, "Money in a Globalized World" in Ngaire Woods ed., The Political Economy of 
Globalization (London: Palgrave, 2000). 
63 Jan Aart Schoite, "Global Trade and Finance," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of 
World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 519 - 539. 
64 Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21" Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
6) Dani Rodrik, ed. In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives 011 Economic Growth. (Princeton 
University Press, 2003). 
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more fundamental qualitative aspect.66 This relates to the change in how states and other 
institutional actors perceive their interests and pursue them. Changes in the thinking and 
modes of operation of major actors are seen to be as significant as the increase in 
economic activity. 
2.2.4. The 'nation state' and the 'internationalfree market' 
As a feature of interdependence, the actions of one state - particularly a 
powerful one - will have some reaction on other states and on a plurality of non-state 
actors, whether they like it or not.67 The impact may be symmetric or asymmetric, in 
other words create dominance or dependency. While an argument can be made for 
systemic forces (both economic and political) beyond the control of states, it can be 
accepted that states, following their own perceived best interests, chose to follow policies 
of economic liberalisation.68 
In the late 1990s Jeffrey Sachs, writing about the most notable features of the "new world 
economy", noted that economies that once were separated were now linked in a dense 
network of interactions.69 What was a new feature, and which in many ways popularised 
the concept of globalisation, was the increased links between high- and low-income 
countries as poorer nations were integrated into a nascent global system. Economic 
globalisation can be seen as the integration of separate national economies, especially as 
functional organization transcends national borders.7o In the realm of political economy 
this integration is visible in trade, finance and also in the growing number of linkages 
through treaties and institutions.7 ! 
66 Ngaire Woods, "The Political Economy of Globalization" in Ngaire Woods ed. The Political Economy of 
Globalization (London: Palgrave, 2000) 1 - 19. 
67 The degree of interdependence depends on a number of factors, particularly communications technology. 
See. for example, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menufor Choice (New York: WH 
Freeman, 1992) p.439. 
6X Robert Schrire, "Globalisation: The Political Dynamics," South African Journal of Economic and 
Management Sciences 4: 3, (September 200 I) 449 - 452. 
69 Jeffrey Sachs, "International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization," Foreign Policy 
(Spring, 1998) p.98. 
70 Held and McGrew, 2002: 38. 
71 Jong-I1 You, 'The Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolution, Reform, and Change" in Deepak Nayyar ed. 
Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 209 - 238. 
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In terms of finance, a major feature is the integration into a global financial market, 
which in effect has made currencies substitutable. Susan Strange's conception was of the 
emergence of 'casino capitalism' where finance was detached from production. 
Speculative transactions have increased volatility and lead to the dangers of capital flight. 
Financial crises, based also on perceptions and the irrationality of the market, are no 
longer confined within domestic economies and often have serious political 
consequences, for instance Indonesia in 1998.72 As Stephen Gill (1997) points out, it is an 
unregulated system since states no longer have authority to exercise accountability.73 
Bhaduri (2002) offers a view that takes into account the fact that states have in fact 
chosen to liberalise markets, since both developing and developed countries "have a 
strong compUlsion to indulge market sentiments" whether rational or irrational.74 An 
increasingly interdependent international political economy means that a country's 
economic prosperity depends on international trade - the openness of which has been 
determined by the actions of states75 . Sachs' empirical evidence on the second half of the 
twentieth century shows that states that tried to 'go it alone', employing mercantilist 
policies like high trade barriers to protect industry from imports, grew much less rapidly 
than export-oriented economies that were more open and increasingly interdependent. 76 
This has occurred within a general trend of an increasingly global liberal international 
economic system, underpinned - if not entirely created - by the dominance of the USA as 
an economic giant and as the hegemon. 77 
n Deepak Nayyar, "Towards Global Governance," in Deepak Nayyar ed. Governing Globalization: Issues 
and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.6 
73 Gill takes issue primarily with "exotic financial instruments" like derivatives and looks at the world stock 
market crash of 1987. Stephen Gill, "Finance, Production and Panopticism: inequality, risk and resistance 
in an era of disciplinary neo-liberalism," in Stephen Gill ed. Globalization, Democratization and 
Multilateralisms (London: Macmillan, 1997) 51 - 76. 
74 Amit Bhaduri, "Nationalism and Economic Policy in the Era of Globalization" in Deepak Nayyar, ed., 
Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.38. 
75 Central to the global economy is the role of multinational companies as a new type of actor. In the 
discussion here it is assumed that they seek to influence governments, whether home or host, and are 
subject to the law of states. 
76 Sachs, 1998: 99 
77 In looking at a number of perspectives on hegemony Balaam and Veseth (1996) see the hegemon as 
created "when the richest and most powerful nation within some sphere of the international political 
economy assumes responsibility for organizing a system of international political and economic relations." 
(Balaam and Veseth, 1996: 52) 
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The preceding section on IPE has looked at, firstly, the theoretical perspectives 
and their explanation of power and hegemony, and secondly, the international state-
market relations. Claims that the economic realities of international market relations 
renders some states powerful and others weak in the international arena, are too narrow if 
the international is limited to economic forces. In Stiglitz's view, our understanding of 
the world is changing.78 The question raised by the qualitative dimension deals with the 
logic of collective action and the global public good. Accordingly, there is a change to 
how the world becomes united, and therefore the process of globalisation must be 
considered with the problem of 'world order' in the most general sense. The next section 
further explores how economic interdependence has led to cooperation, and to the 
creation of regimes. 
2.3. Neoliberal institutionalism 
2.3.1. International cooperation 
International organizations in and of themselves are not politically neutral and 
depend both on prevailing norms and the inclusion of the most important players. 
Looking at economic interdependence without considering the complex interdependence 
of these inter-state relations in an accepted system of international law would be an 
incomplete analysis. For this reason Keohane and Nye are a necessary basis for looking at 
liberal institutionalism.79 
Collective action can also be considered from broadly Marxist and realist perspectives. 
Keohane explains that the Marxist paradigm cannot accommodate inter-state collective 
action since "mutual policy adjustments cannot possibly resolve the contradictions 
7K Joseph E Stiglitz, "Globalization and the Logic ofInternational Collective Action: Re-examining the 
Bretton Woods Institutions" in Deepak Nayyar ed., Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.239. 
79 John Ruggie is also a seminal author. Aside from the work on regimes see also John. G. Ruggie, 
Constructing the World Polity: Essays on international institutionalisation. (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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besetting the system because they are attributable to capitalism rather than to problems of 
coordination among egoistic actors lacking common government.,,80 
From a realist perspective the balance of power theory holds that cooperative endeavours 
such as political-military alliances necessarily form in self-help systems. The anarchic 
structure of the international system forces states to rely on themselves to ensure their 
survival. Unlike hierarchically organized domestic societies, nothing prevents the use of 
force to achieve objectives or breaking contracts to exploit others. For realists, 
international organizations, laws, norms, and regimes simply reflect the interests of the 
strongest states in the system. As Keohane explains, the realist view is of a self-help 
system where "(a)cts of cooperation are accounted for on the grounds that mutual 
interests are sufficient to enable states to overcome their suspicions of one another.,,81 
These institutions, the result of an interstate bargain in which powerful states gain the 
acceptance of small states' to abide by the rules of supranational institutions, therefore 
constrain the weak but not the powerful. Small states agree to accept this because they at 
least have a voice in the institution, the "voice opportunities" thesis, and influence they 
would lack if the larger states resorted to simple coercion. 
As noted, an important shift in the theoretical focus occurred as Keohane and others 
postulated that interdependence creates an interest in cooperation. The increase in 
economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of 
cooperation among states. Simply put cooperation emerges from common interests and 
institutions facilitate cooperation. Neo-liberals see supranationalism as a pooling of 
sovereignty to better achieve common goals and consider realist claims for conflict 
overstated. 82 Institutions are described by neo-liberals as "persistent and connected sets of 
rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
80 Keohane dismisses the marxist paradigm since "Any success in internationalising capital poses grave 
threats to socialist aspirations" (Keohane, 1984: 55). 
81 Keohane, 1984: 62 
82 Robert. O. Keohane, "Global Governance and Accountability," in David Held and Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi, eds., Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003) 130-159. 
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expectations.,,83 For Institutionalists cooperation is essential in a world of economic 
interdependence, and therefore argue that shared economic interests create a demand for 
international institutions.84 Not just formal organizations but more broadly as "recognized 
patterns of practice around which expectations converge.,,85 
2.3.2. Regimes 
In the international system much of the cooperation takes place within 
international regimes. Stephen Krasner defined a regime as "implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' 
expectation converge in any given area of international relations.,,86 The convergence of 
expectations implies that regimes facilitate cooperation by establishing standards of 
behaviour. 87 When all states expect the other participants to cooperate, the probability of 
sustaining cooperation increases. 
The realist view, that regimes simply reflect the distribution of power in the international 
system, means that powerful states create regimes to serve their interests and those 
regimes have no independent power over states. Thus regimes are intervening variables 
between the independent variable (power) and the observed outcome (cooperation). In 
response neo-liberals or liberal institutionalists argue that realists neglect the degree to 
which countries share interests and the iterative nature of state relations. 88 The structualist 
83 Robert O. Keohane. "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, 
1988. 
84 Robert O. Keohane, and Lisa L. Martin "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, 
20: I (Summer, 1995): 39-51. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under 
Anarchy," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarch.'>' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
pp. 226-254. Robert Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," in Keohane, 
International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview, 
1989), pp. 1-7. 
850ran Young, 1980: 377 as cited in Keohane, 1984: 8. 
86 Stephen, D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) 
87 Regimes also facilitate cooperation by providing information on the behaviour of others, and reducing 
the transaction costs of future agreements by formalising procedures and linking issues. As two level game 
analyses has shown, international regimes also increase the likelihood of cooperation by redirecting 
domestic hostility. See also, John G. Conklin, "From GATT to the World Trade Organization: Prospects for 
a Rule Integrity Regime" in C. Roe Goddard, John T Passe- Smith. and John G Conklin eds. International 
Political Economy: State market Relations in the Changing Global Order (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). 
88 Andrew Hurrell, "International society and the study of regimes: a reflective approach", in Volker 
Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) 49-72. 
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perspective of Susan Strange places less emphasis on the political system of territorial 
states arguing rather that the locus of power is to be found in the structure of the world 
economy and relations of production. The state-centeredness of regime theory makes it 
static and value-biased, and the result is an exaggeration of predictability and order. 89 
Strange's recommendation is that "the dynamic character of the 'who-gets-what' of the 
international economy ... is more likely to be captured by looking not at the regime that 
emerges on the surface but underneath, at the bargains on which it is based.,,9o This is a 
valid point, and after briefly dwelling on the 'surface' of the trade regimes the following 
chapters attempt to analyse the nature of the bargains, particularly in the creation of the 
WTO.91 
International trade is naturally an iterated relationship and by institutionalising the 'long 
shadow of the future' the regime encourages the development of a norm of reciprocity.92 
By institutionalising rules and norms regimes define what constitutes a defection and 
prescribe sanctions. Nevertheless regimes still lack the coercive power to force 
compliance and in this sense the international system remains anarchical and thus outside 
the realm of law. 
2.4. International Economic Law 
Thomas Franck, a legal scholar, characterises the realist thinking as accepting that 
disobedience to international "law" is the norm.93 The question he poses is 'Why are rules 
obeyed or not?' and looks to the significance of legitimacy in international relations for 
the answer. For Franck, legitimacy is " a property of a rule or rule-making institution 
which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because 
8Y Susan Strange. "Cave! Hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis," International Organization 36:2, 
(1982). 
90 Strange, 1982: 354. 
91 I look primarily at bargains between states and do not go as deep as Strange recommends in looking at 
bargains between states and corporations, banks, labour unions or political groups. 
92 Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization 40-1 (Winter 
1986): 1-27. 
Y3 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New Yark: Oxford University Press, 
1990) p. 7. 
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those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.,,94 This perspective of 
international legal theory does not answer the political question posed by anarchy but is 
useful when looking at regimes and how they help create a specific legal order. This is 
particularly true in the trade regime, as Deborah Cass explains, "historically the 
development of international law itself runs parallel with the growth of international trade 
and commerce.,,95 The rule-based system of the WTO, and the principles and norms that 
underlie it, has become a fertile field for scholars of international economic law. 
There are a number of international treaties under public international law to which states 
are party and international organizations of which they are members. The principle of 
equal sovereignty of states is central to this, in that they are competent signatories, but the 
question now is whether states have delegated their power to international institutions. 
As Cass explains, the WTO now includes within its "jurisdiction a raft of new issues 
which, to this point, had been entirely within the national legal domain.,,96 This is a 
development either welcomed by those supporting the creation of a binding legal 
economic order, or not welcomed by those seeing a threat to state sovereignty and 
autonomy. Among the latter there are also those who see the WTO as having executive, 
legislative and judicial branches, which erode the power of states and advance the interest 
of international capital. 97 What is clear is that there has been an evolution of the trade 
regime and the basis for this can be tracked in international law. John H. Jackson follows 
the development of trade rules and looks particularly to the process of dispute resolution 
as a substantial issue.98 His conclusion is that there has been an evolution from a 
diplomacy-oriented GATT to a rule-oriented WTO. Others like Matthias Oesch, Robert 
Hilf, and Ernst-Ulrich Peters mann have come to similar conclusions in looking at dispute 
94 Franck, 1990: 24 
95 Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) p.16. 
96 Cass, 2005: 5. 
97 B. S. Chimni, "International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making," European 
Journal of International Law, 15:1 (2004): 1-37. 
9X John Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GAIT and the WTO: Insights 011 Treaty Law and Economic 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
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resolution from a European perspective.99 Petersmann has gone a step further and made a 
strong link between human rights law and international economic law, placing a higher 
priority on a rights-based approach. Gregory Shaffer writes that states will continue 
taking disputes to WTO resolution but that there is also the likelihood of increased 
private interest being involved in initiating cases. IOO Shaffer looks at the US and EU as 
the main users of the dispute settlement system in the earlier years but concludes that the 
trend is now for developing countries, particularly Brazil, to take their cases to the WTO. 
In summary, this chapter has reviewed the literature and assessed the key arguments and 
debates in international political economy. The starting point was the fundamental 
question about the nature of the international system of states, evaluating the realist and 
liberal emphasis on anarchy and order respectively. From this the different theoretical 
perspectives traced the role of the state, analysing the tensions between autonomy and 
interdependence, and leading to the view that the interaction of economic and political 
factors are a necessary area of contemporary study. The second section considered the 
large body of work on development by focusing on three approaches: liberal, mercantilist 
and Marxist. While different paths of economic development exist, with different 
domestic policy prescriptions, the focus of this study is on the creation of the 
international order and the literature on hegemony and institutions is relevant. The 
pervasiveness of an international economic order based on liberal ideology led to the 
focus on literature that examines the state and international institutions. The importance 
of the global nature of market relations was noted as a significant area of recent 
scholarship. Similarly, the problem of world order and the importance of institutions are 
crucial areas for future study. In the third section, the study of international order and an 
international trade regime was considered in terms of neoliberal institutionalism and, 
subsequently, new studies from the perspective of international law. 
99 Matthias, Oesch. Standards of review in WTO dispute resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Meinhard Hilf, "Power, Rules and Principles - Which Orientation for WTOIGAIT Law?" Journal 
of International Economic Law (2001): 111-134; and, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., International trade law 
and the GATTIWTO dispute settlement system (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997). 
IOU Gregory Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-private partnerships in WTO litigation (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
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International economic relations are multidisciplinary and can be approached in different 
ways.10l This study provides a developing country perspective to the recent literature and 
follows the creation of trade rules from this perspective. By looking particularly at the 
context of dispute resolution this study hopes to contribute to others looking at issues of 
importance to countries of the South, and to those considering the development of the 
international trade regime. The important question to bear in mind is whether states will 
resist the waning of their autonomy by manipulating arrangements to maximise their own 
interests, or whether states will accept and formalise institutionalised co-operation. 
Exploring possible answers is the task of the next section. 
101 For a multi-dimensional approach see the volume by Asif H. Qureshi, ed. Perspectives in International 
Economic Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
34 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
CHAPTER 3 
International Trade under the GATT Regime 
In this comparative study there are two areas under examination for which cooperation is 
required. Firstly, how countries of the South are able to set the agenda, secondly, how 
countries of the South can manage disputes within or outside the trade regime. This 
Chapter deals with these two areas under the GATT regime. Section 3.2. considers the 
North-South agenda from the perspective of developing countries in the early GATT 
Rounds, and the limited success of attempts to shape or reform GAIT. This leads, in 
Section 3.3., to explanations of how these States pursued initiatives outside of the GATT, 
specifically through UNCTAD. Section 3.4. assesses the political and legal foundations 
for cooperation on matters of trade and development. The next section, Section 3.1 
discusses briefly the important but ambivalent role of the hegemon before entering into 
the important detail of the GATT treaty and the regime it establishes. 
3.1. The ITO and the origin of the GATT 
3.1.1. Introduction - the three pillars of the post war world 
The major initiatives leading to the establishment of the GATT were taken by the 
United States during World War II, in cooperation with its allies - particularly the United 
Kingdom. 102 It was generally accepted that in the post-war order, rule-based multilateral 
institutions were needed to monitor and regulate economic relations among nations. 
Cooperation was chosen, partly due to the circumstances of war, but also because of the 
experience of the Great Depression and the pre-war economic situation. 103 President 
Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull, looking at the breakdown of economic 
102 In July 1945, Congress granted president Truman authority to conclude an agreement for reciprocal 
tariff reduction. See Peter van den Bossche, The law and polic.,>, of the World Trade Organization: text, 
cases and materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.79. 
103 This was a time of protectionist trade - Britain entered into preferential arrangements with her 
dependencies, the US erected high tariff walls. 
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relations during the interwar years, concluded that "unhampered trade dovetailed with 
peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war.,,104 
For an autonomous and rational state, the potential risks of a loss of autonomy in 
economic policy were weighed up against the benefits of cooperation with other states 
and participation in the multilateral institutions. Though free trade was the ideal, and to 
be reached eventually, the domestic experiences of the major powers suggested the need 
for an active role for the state. Free trade promoted peace between nations through 
interdependence and prosperity through comparative advantage. 105 Peace within nations 
was sought through high employment, education, and a social safety net provided by the 
welfare state. 106 There was wide agreement that national governments had an important 
role of domestic intervention in managing the stability of their own national economies. 
The compromise between economic nationalism and free trade liberalism, termed 
'embedded liberalism', was formalised in the Bretton Woods institutions. l07 
The USA was instrumental in creating the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order to 
promote its own economic development, the reconstruction of Europe and a general 
expansion of world trade. The main discussions formalising these institutions, dominated 
by Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes - the American and British 
representatives respectively - took place at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. 108 
This conference was devoted to addressing monetary and banking issues, and thus under 
the jurisdiction of ministers of finance - and thus to the exclusion of trade 
104 Ethan B. Kapstein, "Distributing the Gains: Justice and International Trade," Journal of International 
Affairs, 52:2 (1999) p. 538. 
IDS The goal of free trade did not imply only multilateral options. The US, by the end of the war had entered 
into thirty-two bilateral agreements. (See Cass, 2005: 9) 
IOn Ethan B. Kapstein, "Distributing the Gains: Justice and International Trade," Journal of International 
Affairs, 52:2 (1999) p. 535-7. 
107 John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: embedded liberalism in the post-
war economic order," International Organization 36:2, (1982): 379-415. See also George Sorenson, The 
Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat. (London: Macmillan, 2004) pAO. 
108 Paul Johnson, Modern Times (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996). 
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representatives. 109 At Bretton Woods, therefore, two pillars for international economic 
order came into existence, the IMF and the World Bank, but the third pillar envisaged, 
the International Trade Organization (ITO) did not. 
3.1.2. ITO and US domestic politics 
The idea for an international organization to develop and coordinate international 
trade had been discussed at Bretton Woods, but not finalized, and the multilateral 
discussions continued after the founding of the United Nations. llo Multilateral trade 
discussions took place in the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which at its 
first meeting adopted a resolution calling for a conference to draft a Charter for an 
International Trade Organization. Negotiations over the ITO were held in New York and 
Geneva in 1947. The main objectives were (1) to draft an ITO charter, (2) prepare 
schedules for tariff reductions and (3) prepare a multilateral treaty containing general 
principles of trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). 
Progress was made on the tariff cuts and GATT, and A Protocol of Provisional 
Application was adopted so that the GAIT reductions could come into effect 
immediately from 1 January 1948. 111 A final round of negotiations on the ITO charter 
was left for a further meeting in Havana later that year. 112 At the Havana Conference 
work on the ITO Charter was completed, and signed by the participating countries, but 
the Charter never came into effect. The support of the US was crucial, and, as the third 
pillar in the larger picture of the US-led initiative, expected. President Harry Truman 
submitted the ITO Charter to Congress for ratification, but a coalition of protectionist 
interests prevented its approval. The Republicans had won control of the Congress in the 
1948 election, and by 1950 the Truman administration announced it would no longer seek 
109 The conference did recognise the need for a comparable international institution for trade. (See John H. 
Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1998) p.16. 
110 Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations commits member states to cooperation on economic and 
social issues. 
111 Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 
55 U.N.T.S. 308. [GATT 1947]. Conflicting national laws could remain unaltered (the grandfather clause) 
and there was no need for Congress to ratify the Protocol. 
112 The Havana Conference was convened by the UN, through its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
as the International Conference on Trade and Employment. 
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congressional approval. I 13 The non-participation of the United States, the world's leading 
economy and trading nation, meant the end of the ITO before it even started and left the 
GATT 1947 as the only existing multilateral international institution for regulating trade. 
3.1.3. GATT as provisional arrangement 
The failure to adopt the ITO Charter meant that the intended international 
organization in trade, comparable to the World Bank and the IMF in finance, did not 
materialize, and that the GATT gradually began to fill this void - though originally it was 
only a provisional agreement. The ITO Charter had more extensive provisions -
particularly on economic development. I 14 Since these were not put into effect and since 
the protocol of application was provisional, domestic legislation that was inconsistent 
with the substantive obligations could be maintained. 115 According to GATT 1947, states 
were to meet regularly as a bargaining forum for trade concessions, with the view to 
reduce tariff barriers. The GATT was not conceived of as an international organization, 
with no secretariat or governance structure provided for, but as Kenneth Dam points out, 
it became the de facto international organization for international trade. I 16 The history of 
GATT since may be seen as a process of structuring and formulating rules for a coherent 
system of multilateral trade. I I? 
3.1.4. GATT norms - non-discrimination, liberalization, reciprocity, and safeguards 
The original GATT Treaty (referred to as GATT 1947) consists of three parts. 
• Part 1, focuses on non-discrimination, or most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
• Part 2, concerns the elimination of nontariff barriers (NTBs) 
113 Without US approval the ITO would have proved unworkable and other states would have been 
reluctant to join - prior to the US decision only Australia and Liberia had formally ratified the treaty. See 
Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1991)p.21. 
114 The ITO had also included a chapter on international commodity agreements (lCAs). which would have 
been of benefit to third world producers. Kevin Watkins, Fixing the rules: North-South issues in 
international trade and the GATT Uruguay Round (London: Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, 1992) p.22. 
lIS William 1. Davey, "Institutional Framework" in Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael 
G. Plummer, eds. The World Trade Organization: Legal. Economic and Political Analysis (New York: 
Springer, 2(05) p.54. 
116 Kenneth W. Dam, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Law and International Economic 
Organization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) p.88. 
117 Hilf, 2001:14 
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• Part 3, deals with procedure and dispute resolution. 
Since the treaty sought to coordinate state behaviour in international trade, it is useful to 
consider it in tenns of a regime, as introduced in chapter 2. The four defining elements of 
a regime are: principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. This definition is 
based on Krao;;ner's, who defines a regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision making procedures around which actors' expectation converge in any given 
area of international relations.,,118 The economic principles that underlie the regime have 
been noted, and emphasize the value of open, non-discriminatory economic transactions 
in maximizing global welfare. There are also principles that may place higher value on 
political, social or cultural prevailing beliefs. In this section though, the focus is on 
nonns, since the principles themselves do not constitute specific legal or policy 
guidelines. This follows the line of analysis adopted by Finlayson and Zacher that "it is 
the norms that provide the foundation of the regime since they constitute the general 
obligations and rights that are a guide to states' behaviour in designing decision-making 
procedures and in formulating and implementing ruIeS.,,119 In brief, the basic nonn of 
GA IT requires States to move towards liberalization by reducing and eventually 
eliminating tariffs. The Rules are the more detailed prescriptions contained in specific 
agreements, while the decision-making procedures provide the ways for implementation. 
Article I of GAIT established the norm of non-discrimination, which give benefits to all 
contracting parties, each promising most favourable treatment. Since all states are legally 
equal - at least according to the legal principle of the sovereign equality of states - this 
meant equal treatment for all irrespective of any other factors, including the level of 
economic development. 120 This was also known as a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clause, and can be seen as the cornerstone of GATT. 121 Under Article 1: 1, "any 
118 Krasner, 1983. 
119 Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the regulation of trade barriers: Regime 
dynamics and functions" in Stephen, D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983) p. 276. 
120 Rosalind H. Thomas, "Regional arrangements of developing countries and the World Trade 
Organisation from a law and policy perspective: The case of the Southern African Development 
Community" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2001) p. 72. 
121 Former Director General of GATT, Eric Wyndham-White as quoted in Finlayson and Zacher, 1983:278 
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advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.,,122 The importance given to this norm can be seen in the fact that 
unanimous consent is required for any amendment. 
Under Article 1:2 there is an important permanent exemption of significance for some 
developing countries, primarily the colonies and ex-colonies, in that they were to 
continue to enjoy the historical preferential access to the markets of which their 
economies were already part. These preferential agreements gave them better than MFN 
tariff rates and other advantages other states did not enjoy. For example, the Imperial 
Preference Scheme, established by Great Britain in 1932, maintained preferential 
arrangements such as duty-free imports between the United Kingdom and the 
Commonwealth and other colonial linkages. The Benelux and France had similar 
agreements with its dependent territories, and these were labelled the 'grandfather clause 
preferences' and are in Annex A-D of the GATT. 123 
Article III of GATT established the national treatment norm, and imposed an obligation 
of like treatment for domestic and imported goods. Non-discrimination thus applies also 
between an imported product and a like domestic product. What this means in practice is 
that once the applicable tariff is collected on imported products, no law or regulation 
should then affect competition in the domestic market. 124 Put simply, like products should 
be treated equally, irrespective of their origin. There are several exceptions, including on 
the provision of subsidies to domestic products and the arrangements making up regional 
free trade areas, but which had the effect of working against the interest of developing 
countries. 125 
122 Mitsuo Matsushita. Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: 
Law, Practice, and Polic.,>, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.147-8. 
m Raj Bhala, Modern GATT law: a treatise on the General Agreement 011 Tariffs and Trade (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) pp. 74-84. 
124 Matsushita et ai, 2003:156. 
125 As Das (2003) and others have pointed out, the infant industry protection argument can be so justified: 
"In a possible environment where the domestic product has to face competition from an imported product 
backed by the immense economic strength of the producer and exporter of a developed country, the former 
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The reciprocity norm was initially quite central to the process of bargaining, since a 
country benefiting from the lowering of another's trade barriers was expected to 
reciprocate. In the text of the agreement it is less clear cut what the expectation of 
reciprocity entails. In Article XXVIII bis, which was added in 1955, refers to negotiations 
conducted "on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis ... " 126 In practice, since the 
rich countries also had the biggest markets and high volumes of trade they had the 
leverage to bargain for reciprocal concessions. The US, Japan and the European countries 
were the strongest adherents of reciprocity since they traded mainly with each other. As 
Bhagirath Das puts it, "If a country is not able to 'give', it does not 'get'" and thus 
reciprocity in the GAIT is "a built in mechanism in the fundamentals of the system that 
will ensure an increase in disparity" among member states. 127 Part IV, providing for 
special and differential treatment, was added in 1965 and the reciprocity requirement for 
developing countries was waived. 
Finlayson and Zacher see the various exceptions and "escape clauses" that waive rules in 
cases of economic difficulty as the "safeguard norm" of GATT. 128 These safeguard 
actions apply on a temporary basis, usually but not always as a result of some emergency 
or "exceptional circumstances" and allow exceptions to the basic rules: 
• An exception for national security (Article XXI); 
• An exception in cases of market disruption (Article XIX); 
• Exceptions for quotas for balance-of-payment purposes (Articles XII, XIII, XIV, 
XV and later XVIII:B); 
• An exception for customs unions and free trade areas (Article XXIV); and, 
• Exceptions for developing countries (Article XVIII and Part IV, added in 1965). 
This final point, on the exceptions for developing countries, grew in importance over time 
as more developing countries joined GATT and cooperated to seek special treatment 
naturally suffers a great disadvantage and handicap." Bhagirath Lal Das, The WTO and the Multilateral 
trading System: Past, present andfuture. (London: Zed Books, 2003) p.37 
126 Finlayson and Zacher, 1983: 287. 
127 Das, 2003: 65. 
128 Finlayson and Zacher, 1983: 290. 
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from developed countries in the trading regime. This gradual but significant change, how 
it came about and what its implications were, is the subject of the next section (3.2.). 
Before entering into that discussion it is first necessary to consider what arrangements 
GATT provided to deal with the resolution of disputes. 
3.1.5. Part 3 and dispute resolution 
State practice showed that, even if they did not lead directly to conflict, disputes 
between trading powers were not uncommon. GATT contained provisions relating to the 
settlement of disputes 129 but, as Deborah Cass explains, "judicial conflict resolution was 
far from the minds of the contracting parties" as GATT was more about bargaining for 
trade concessions than "legalized decision-making.,,13o 
Article XXII, entitled 'Consultation' establishes the procedures for dispute resolution and 
emphasises that it is negotiation and diplomacy rather than litigation that is the GATT's 
modus operandi. Article XXII, provides for consultation, where a contracting party can 
file a complaint with GATT and request formal bilateral consultation with the offending 
state. The complaining party can also exert multilateral 'peer pressure' by acting jointly 
in coalition with other states. Article XXIII, allows a contracting party to make a 
complaint and seek formal dispute settlement proceedings, and can request a Panel to be 
formed by the GATT. Originally all contracting parties could take part, but by the mid 
1950s there were 3-5 members in the Panel of Experts and the procedure was later 
institutionalised. 131 The Panel received oral and written submissions in camera, and after 
deliberation presented its report and recommendations to the GATT Council. 132 This 
plenary of the contracting parties would adopt reports, but only by positive consensus. 
According to Stoll and Schorkopf this development had only limited effect since the 
contracting parties had the final decision and "this gave the losing party the opportunity 
not only to reject the Panel report as a whole, but also numerous possibilities to delay the 
129 The GATT articles relating to the settlement of disputes are Article XXII and Article XXIII. 
130Cass,2005: 10. 
m Codified in the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding on Dispute Settlement. 
132 The GATT Council was created in 1960. (See Davey, 2005: 55) 
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ruling."m The losing party was requested to comply with the recommendations of the 
report, but even if they chose to do so there was no way to measure compliance with the 
report. If the losing party refused the panel's recommendations it could pay compensation 
to the winning party. If this failed then the GATT Council, again acting in consensus, 
would authorise the winning party proportional retaliation -usually by withdrawing 
GAIT obligations owed to the losing party. 
The main weakness of the GATT dispute resolution procedure is that Article XXII 
contains no "menacing enforcement mechanism." 134 The threat of 'retaliation' was an 
empty threat; in practice only in one case did the contracting parties actually condone 
it. 135 The repeated use of the blocking veto, either to block the formation of a panel, the 
adoption of the report, or blocking the authority to retaliate was another weakness. It not 
only hampered GAIT dispute resolution but also had ramifications outside of it. 
Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s it led to the criticism of GAIT as politicised and 
ineffective when it came to settling disputes. 136 Clearly, the dispute settlement procedure 
was susceptible to political power. 
3.1.6. Conclusion 
By way of summary, the treaty provisions outlined above, and their practical 
development through state practice over time, served to institutionalise the GATT. In 
reality states were, at best, inconsistent in observing these founding principles. Although 
GAIT created contractual obligations, there was no machinery for enforcing obligations. 
The original provisions of a temporary arrangement were deficient to constitute a formal 
international organization. The birth defects of GATT also led to criticism in its 
functioning. One commentator identified "the less than transparent nature of the 
negotiating process" and rightly concluded that the "fairly secretive institution" was 
133 Peter-Tobias Stoll, and Frank Schorkopf. WTO: world economic order, world trade law (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) p.n. 
134 Bhala, 2005: 1151. 
135 The Netherlands was allowed to retaliate on American restrictions on its dairy products by suspending 
concessions granted to American wheat. The retaliation was in any case ineffective and had little impact on 
the large American economy. Bhala, 2005: 1160. 
136 Cass, 2005: 11. 
43 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
therefore dominated by the major powers to the exclusion of developing countries. 137 It is 
nevertheless still relevant to ask: What were the principal accomplishments of GAIT? As 
an international treaty GATT served as the basis for eight rounds of multilateral trade 
talks, formalising trade negotiation as an alternative to potentially harmful trade wars. 
There was an in-built dynamic since new contracting parties benefited automatically from 
all previous discussions, giving momentum to the lowering of all barriers to trade. 
Judging GATT on its own modest merits from the liberal perspective, it was successful in 
the progressive reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade on a worldwide basis. 
Table 1: GATT Rounds 
Round Location Date Countries Approx. Tariff 
Concessions 
1 Geneva 1947 23 45000 
2 Annecy 1949 33 5000 
3 Torquay 1950-1 34 8700 
4 Geneva 1956 22 
5 Geneva 'Dillon Round' 1960-1 45 4400 
6 Geneva 'Kennedy Round' 1962-7 48 
7 Tokyo 1973-9 99 
8 Uruguay 1986-94 120+ 
Source: Jackson, 1999: 74; Bhala, 2005: 228-9. 
A controversial question still remains when evaluating GAIT's accomplishments, and 
that is how it has fared in support of the economic development of poor countries. Given 
that a reduction in the barriers to trade is a stimulus to economic growth, and that 
according to liberal economic theory this should be of benefit to all, including developing 
countries, GATT has played a role in stimulating development through trade. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to claim with any certainty that such a role was the intention of 
those drafting the document. In fact, some have argued, that GAIT did very little that 
was positive for the majority of poor countries, but locked them politically in a 
relationship of dependence. What follows, therefore, considers the political dynamics of 
137 G. K. Helleiner, "Developing Countries in Global Economic Governance and Negotiation Processes," in 
Deepak Nayyar ed. Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) p. 316. 
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international trade by looking at developing countries and their efforts at refonning the 
GAIT trade regime. 
3.2. North South agenda: Colonial ties and the early GATT Rounds 
3.2.1 Developing countries 
Of the original 23 contracting parties to the GATT 1947, ten were' developing 
countries', though the term itself was never defined in the GATT regime 138. The original 
ten were Brazil, Burma, China, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon. 
China withdrew in 1949, as did Syria and Lebanon, but the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Nicaragua and Uruguay joined GATT at the Annecy Round. 139 There are various 
explanations, at different levels of analysis, of why, for the most part, developing 
countries were never major players. Three are considered here. 
From the mercantilist view, where wealth equals power, as small economies these states 
were merely small powers in the international system. The low volume of their trade 
compared to the rest of the world relegated their importance to the economic periphery. 
From the US hegemonic position, the less developed countries could best advance their 
development by participating in the international multilateral, non-discriminatory, GATT 
regime, while at the same time complying domestically by introducing a system with the 
lowest possible tariff levels. 
From the view of the nation state, the newly decolonised and other developing countries 
for the most part did not consider international trade as an essential part of their national 
economic strategies. The prevailing view was that the less developed countries, rather 
than engaging in the international market, required substantial state support and 
intervention in the domestic economy. Colonial administrations had introduced 
significant state participation in the economy, not only in infrastructure development but 
13K The 23 founding members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, 
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan. Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. 
139 Matsushita et ai, 2003: 374-5. 
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also in providing capital. Development theories of the 1950s considered these states as 
victims of "late-late" development and therefore emphasised inward-oriented 
development paths. In the context of competition with the economically powerful highly 
industrialized states, the path to economic development rested on a strategy of import 
substitution and trade protectionism. 140 The rationale for this view stressed that for those 
countries there was little to gain from exports and little to lose from excluding imports. 141 
Among the more prominent development economists of the period, such as Albert 
Hirschman, Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Max Singer, was 
the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch who had considerable influence on the policies of 
the developing countries. Prebisch played a key role at the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) and the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). 
A third view places prominence on the institutional context, suggesting that the technical 
rules of GAIT further contributed to the grievances of developing countries. 142 For 
instance, GAIT operated on the basis of major traders in commodities negotiating 
together, and then presenting the outcome for agreement to the rest. As there were few 
commodities where developing countries were the major suppliers, or indeed purchasers, 
they could not expect to approach negotiations from a position of strength when it came 
to international trade diplomacy. The power to set the agenda was also heavily against the 
developing countries' interests. As discussed in detail in the previous section the dispute 
settlement mechanism was weak and largely ineffective. 
Table 2: Growth in Developing Country membership of GATT 1952-64 
Date Developing TOTAL GATT members 
1952 13 33 
1953 14 34 
1955 14 35 
1958 16 37 
140 The state played a very important role in the post-war development of Western Europe, including in 
Britain and in France. 
141 Gilpin, 2001: 306. 
142 Sheila Page and Michael Davenport. World trade reform: Do developing coulltries gain or lose? 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 1994) p. 114. 
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1960 18 39 
1961 20 43 
1962 35 59 
1964 40 64 
Source: Williams, 1991: 24. 
An important aspect, already discussed above under MFN treatment, has to do with the 
preferential arrangements that ex-colonies or dependent territories received from the old 
colonial countries and that meant that they received special and differential treatment. 
Their inclusion into GAIT meant that in effect, they were exempt from strict adherence 
to trade liberalisation obligations. There are different ways to see this allowance. For the 
Americans, these exemptions as 'grandfather rights' were to the benefit of the UK and 
France in maintaining their spheres of influence. At the same time such arrangements 
were welcome by beneficiary developing countries in that they secured market access for 
their goods, for instance in the case of bananas from the West Indies sold in the UK. 143 
Other developing countries on the contrary found such arrangements unfair. 
The picture thus presented is one where international, domestic and institutional factors 
limited the capability and constrained the choices of developing countries. The 
developing countries' signatory to GATT could exert little pressure multilaterally and not 
surprisingly, played only a small role initially. But as their numbers rose due to 
decolonisation, independence and the emergence of new nation states, this brought new 
dynamics to international trade negotiations. Developing countries began to assert 
themselves and sought ways to cooperate in the institutions governing international trade. 
The extent of their success is considered in the next section. 
3.2.2. Reforms and the early GATT Rounds 
The major reform initiative of the early period focused on reviewing the General 
Agreement, while all the subsequent reform initiatives essentially centred on the 
143 Gordon Myers, Banana Wars: The Price of Free Trade (London: Zed Books, 2004). 
47 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
fundamental, though not explicit, question of what degree of policy autonomy Third 
World governments should have. 144 
The GAIT Review Session (1954-55) recognized the importance of the argument for 
policies allowing infant industry protection in the developing countries. The suggested 
reforms led to the amendment of Article XVIII, entitled 'Governmental Assistance to 
Economic Development' by recognizing the right to use import restrictions and to raise 
tariffs in order to protect infant industries. 145 
Article XVIII was thus the principal provision dealing directly with the trading problems 
of developing countries. In effect, the new article served to bring some definition to the 
concept of a 'developing' country by applying it only to a country, "the economy of 
which can only support low standards of living and is in the early stages of 
development". 146 Article XVIII also reflected the predominance at the time of the import 
substitution approach to national economic development. This state centric view saw the 
formal political independence already achieved as a step towards meaningful economic 
independence. 
The GAIT ministerial meeting of 1957 focused on the issues of concern to developing 
countries: low export growth and fluctuating commodity prices. These were also part of 
an important study called the Haberler Report l47 , which concluded that the problems 
faced by the less developed countries were due to protectionist trade policies of 
developed countries. Increasingly, the structural nature of the world economy was seen as 
preventing rather than encouraging economic growth in these countries. 
Following Haberler's recommendations, GATT Contracting Parties agreed to undertake a 
programme of action. Committee I was set up to encourage general tariff reductions, 
Committee II with examining the problems of international trade arising from agricultural 
144 S.P. Shukla, "From the GATT to the WTO and Beyond," in Deepak Nayyar ed .. Governing 
Globalization Issues and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 256. 
145 Matsushita et ai, 2003: 380. 
146 Dam, 1970: 227, and Williams, 1991: 24. 
147 Gottfreid Haberler et ai, Contracting Parties to the GATT, Trends in International Trade (1958) 
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protection policies, and Committee III with looking at measures restricting the trade of 
the developing world. The problems identified then are similar to those of concern today. 
Committee III reported that the exports of developing countries faced high tariffs when 
trying to enter the markets of the developed world over a wide range of products: 
vegetable oils, coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton products, leather goods, and also manufactured 
products. In addition, these exports faced domestic taxes and levies that further restrained 
consumption. These internal taxes, however, were not seen as a violation of GATT, since 
there were no 'equivalent' domestic products in the developing world. 148 
The agriculture sector remained outside the realm of GAIT regulation and the North 
exploited this 'agriculture gap' .149 In 1955 the US blocked efforts to extend to agriculture 
GAIT rules outlawing export subsidisation. The US was granted a waiver allowing it to 
impose import controls on agricultural products. 150 Similarly the EC maintained a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to insulate its market by offering price support, and, 
as supply began to outstrip demand, by giving export subsidies - resulting in 
agricultural produce being dumped on the world market. The exception of agricultural 
trade from GAIT meant that the one area of importance to exporters from the South was 
not up for discussion. 
Within the GATT negotiations themselves developing country participation was limited. 
The first five negotiating rounds focused on the reduction of tariffs. The fifth GAIT 
round (1960-1), named after US Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, who proposed 
the negotiations, dealt primarily with the inclusion of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) participating as a single entityl51. At the Dillon Round, only Chile, 
Haiti, India, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan and Peru participated. More significantly, of the 
4400 tariff concessions only 160 reductions on duties were on items of interest to 
developing countries. As worldwide trade expanded at unprecedented rates and fuelled 
world economic growth, the developing nations' share of world trade declined. Between 
14X GATT Basic Instruments, 7th Supplement, 1959. 
149 Joseph A. McMahon, Agricultural trade, protectionism and the problems of development: a legal 
perspective (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992). 
150 Watkins, 1992: 21. 
151 The six member EEC was formed in 1957 
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1953 and 1961, the developing nations' share of world trade declined by 22 per cent. 152 
The divide between rich and poor nations was becoming more apparent. 
3.3. UN CT AD and Development 
3.3.1. UNCTAD 1 and Special and Differential Treatment (Part IV) 
Developed and developing countries could not see eye-to-eye because it was not 
clear where GAIT was actually heading. This limited how far attempted reforms could 
go, and led to developing countries eventually looking outside of GAIT to drive their 
South agenda. For the most part, developed countries viewed GAIT as a passive 
organization where barriers to trade were reduced and negotiated on a quid pro quo basis. 
It would be optimistic to expect the developed countries to introduce substantial reforms 
by themselves. Historically, the strategy of developing countries within the trade regime 
has been to limit the reach of the norm of reciprocity by seeking 'differential and more 
favourable treatment'. Special and differential treatment (SDT) has included unilateral 
trade preferences from developed countries and various exemptions or deferrals. 
The 1960s saw the accession to the General Agreement of newly independent countries. 
As a consequence of the Haberler Report, as well as other studies that were product 
specific, the developing countries began to find common ground and began to organise as 
a pressure group in GATT. They called for further and much more comprehensive change 
by introducing a resolution for an Action Programme. 153 This can also be understood in 
the wider political context of strengthened Third World solidarity.154 Developing 
countries, concerned by their lack of benefits in international trade, called for a 
conference specifically devoted to tackling these problems and identifying appropriate 
international actions. 
152 Williams. 1991: 28. 
153 Williams, 1991: 25. 
154 The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia. in April 1955 had important repercussions. By 
1960, with the entry of 18 new members, developing countries were in the majority in the UN General 
Assembly. 
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Political initiatives outside the GAIT negotiations led to the expectation that significant 
progress in international trade favouring the least developed countries could be achieved. 
The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) met in 
Geneva in 1964 and was institutionalised to meet every four years. A permanent 
secretariat, under Raul Prebisch was established. Over the next decade, the developing 
countries used UNCT AD as the principal vehicle to attempt to reform and restructure the 
world economy. This process brought into focus the sharp division between the states of 
the North and the South. Unsurprisingly, the first official statement of the Group of 77 
(G-77), issued at the end of UNCTAD I, concentrated on formulating economic demands 
to the rich nations. 155 
What began as an isolated UN Conference became in the words of one observer "a 
permanent body commanding the allegiance of the entire less developed world".156 The 
response from the developed countries was mixed. The United States held fast in 
defending the traditional position of GATT, based on non-discrimination and a liberal 
world economic system. The French saw managed international markets with 
discriminatory trade arrangements (in accordance to the preferences of ex-colonial 
partners) as a solution to closing the 'trade gap'. But, it was not principally an economic 
analysis that dominated UNCT AD and an ideological consensus along political lines 
quickly emerged. In the one country one vote system of the UN, the less developed 
countries, in solidarity as the G-77, posed potentially a very powerful bloc in 
international economic relations. 
In 1965, in response to the emergence of UNCTAD and the solidarity of the G-77, the 
GAIT Contracting Parties agreed to the addition of Part IV (on Trade and 
Development). The additional chapter to GAIT required developed countries to give 
high priority to reducing their trade barriers to products from the developing countries. 157 
The concept of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) was introduced, stating 
155 Morten Ougaard, "The Origins of the Second Cold War," New Left Review, 147 (Sep-Oct 1984) p.68. 
150 Dam, 1970: 237. 
157 A Committee on Trade and Development was established to oversee the functioning of the new GATT 
provisions. 
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explicitly that the exports of developing countries should be given preferential access to 
markets of developed countries, and, that the developing countries participating in trade 
negotiations need not fully reciprocate the concessions they received. This principle was 
first widely discussed during the Kennedy Round, and as Part IV of GAIT obligated 
developed countries to pursue trade policies taking into account the development needs of 
developing countries. 
The important articles of Part IV are Articles XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII. I58 Article 
XXXVI, 'Principles and Objectives', containing the provision on reciprocity, referred to 
the need for improved market access for all LDC products and the need for price 
stabilization for primary products. Article XXXVII, 'Commitments', spelled these out 
though in a highly qualified form. Article XXXVIII, entitled 'Joint Action', was 
significant in establishing the legal framework for the Trade and Development 
Committee that, in the final analysis, provided the base for future progress. 
Part IV recognized the need to provide 'more favourable and acceptable conditions of 
access' for developing countries' primary products, and increased access 'under 
favourable conditions' for processed and manufactured products of export interest to less-
developed countries. Put directly, "The developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove 
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of the less developed contracting parties.,,159 But, 
and there's always a but, obligations in Part IV were not legally binding and remained on 
the basis of implementation on the quaintly named 'best-endeavour' effort. 
Even as the Kennedy Round took place, the protectionist lobbies in the United States 
were increasingly powerful in shaping the trade agenda. As the world's largest trading 
power this had widespread effect. European countries, in establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC), introduced various non-tariff barriers and other 
protections, strongly supported by politically powerful lobbies, especially in agriculture. 
15K Matsushita ef aI, 2003: 382. 
159 Dam, 1970: 238. 
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The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had the effect of protecting European farmers 
from competitive world prices. This affected not only agricultural exporters in the 
developed world but in an increasingly global economy, raising entry for products from 
the developing world. Countries in Europe also sought to gain advantage by continuing 
preferential arrangements with their former colonies. For example, in Britain through the 
Commonwealth Preference Area, and in the EEC - dominated by France - through the 
Yaounde Convention. These agreements had some positive implications for those who 
participated, and no doubt developing country producers desired to maintain their 
benefits, but in the bigger picture the overall effect was detrimental in that it led to states 
seeking preferential rather than multilateral negotiations. 
3.3.2. UNCTAD II and Preferences 
The South's push for restructuring trade relations continued at UNCTAD II in 
New Delhi, India in 1968. Here developing countries were encouraged to expand 
manufactured and semi-manufactured exports by making such goods more competitive in 
developed country markets. The way to achieve this, it was argued, was through 
introducing tariff preferences. However, a system of preferences would be derogation 
from the Most Favoured Nation principle, a cornerstone of GATT 1947. 
Even though preferences would make the MFN principle seem more like an exception 
than a general rule of GATT, this was not necessarily a hurdle as this also had some 
support from the EEC (under the Brasseur Plan advocating selective preferences) and 
also from those African countries associated. The United States and the United Kingdom 
were more reluctant in supporting the UNCTAD proposal of introducing a Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) for manufactured exports, but a tentative consensus was 
achieved. 160 
The GSP gave unilateral trade concessions to the countries of the South. More 
specifically it was an agreement for temporary and non-reciprocal grants of preferences 
by developed countries to developing countries. Developed countries would each 
160 In order to get around GATT's most-favoured-nation clause, a waiver was adopted. In the Tokyo Round, 
the Enabling Clause established a legal basis within GATT for extending GSP benefits. (On the GSP, and 
the Tokyo Round negotiations see Matsushita et ai, 2003: 383) 
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determine their own system of preferences, specifying the goods and margins of 
preference. Since the concessions were mainly on manufactured goods, those countries 
that stood to benefit were the newly industrialising countries, or NICs. 161 Just four 
countries - Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and China - received 44% of GSP trade 
benefits. 162 In effect, low-income countries had no option but to become outward looking 
in their development policies if they were to benefit from preferences. 
Other systems of preferences that were not multilateral were also in operation. The Lome 
Convention, for example, granted 68 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
preferential links with the EEC, allowing market access to commodities, subject to 
criteria such as rule of origin and other quotas, and only if the trade posed no threat to the 
already heavily protected European agricultural sector. Unsurprisingly, despite the Lome 
preferences, the ACP countries' share of imports to the EEC fell. 
Special and Differential treatment in the GATT entailed l63 : 
• Allowing the developing countries to use forms of protection from which 
developed countries are disbarred (e.g. protection for balance of payments or 
infant industry reasons); 
• Preferential access to developed country markets in the form of the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP); 
• A statement that developing countries need not offer reciprocal tariff reductions in 
tariff negotiations; 
• Allowing developing countries to exempt themselves from many of the 
agreements on rules; 
As it was adopted, SDT was seen as a welcome breakthrough in North-South relations. 
Nevertheless, certain analysts suggested that the concessions by the North were not at all 
altruistic, but given for strategic reasons, particularly in order to limit Soviet influence in 
161 Alasdair MacBean, and P.N. Snowden, International Institutions in Trade and Finance (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1981) p.104. 
162 Watkins, 1992: 34. 
163 N. L. McCulloch, Alan Winters and X. Cicera, Trade Liberalization and Poverty: A Handbook (London: 
DFID, 2001) p.167. 
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the Cold War geopolitical struggle for the South. Others argued that the South was given 
a 'free ride' with little damage done to the liberal regime precisely because these states 
were of such marginal significance. 164 Analysts have pointed to other consequences for 
the trade regime, because "by implying that trade liberalization was bad for developing 
countries, SDT legitimised the argument for avoiding it, and left developing 
countries ... outside the liberalization dynamic of the world system. They undertook little 
liberalization of their own, and because they offered so little, they obtained very little 
liberalization from developed countries for the commodities in which they were 
interested.,,165 
In summary, developing countries negotiated to seek preferential treatment and to expand 
their rights to deviate from the OA TT rules. The provision of Article XVIII was used to 
protect their domestic industries and internal markets from imports. Developing countries 
extended tariff preferences for access to markets and were able to deviate from the 
obligation to grant reciprocity. 166 
Seeking special treatment had unforeseen consequences. On the question of preferences, 
clearly only a handful of already industrializing states stood to benefit. Those states that 
already enjoyed selective preferential arrangements - often based on colonial structures 
- were reluctant to give up these preferences for a generalized system. In conclusion, 
"preferences have not proven to be very effective as an instrument of development. They 
often came laden with restrictions, product exclusions and administrative rules that 
prevented beneficiaries from using them fully. Even when effective, they diverted trade 
away from equally poor but excluded developing countries.,,167 The net effect was a 
division along Latin American, Asian and African lines that tested the unity of the 077. 
This aspect of the South alliance will be considered in the next section. 
1M Watkins, 1992: 33. 
165 McCulloch et ai, 2001: 167-8. 
166 Diana Tussie, The less developed countries and the world trading system: A challenge to the GATT 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) p.138. 
167 Bernard Hoekman, Developing Countries and the Political Economy of the Trading System (Helsinki: 
United Nations University Press World Institute for Development Economic Research, 2002) p. 30. 
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3.4. New International Economic Order and the G77 
Historically considered, and with few exceptions, the rich nations of the 
eighteenth century comprised the rich nations of the end of the twentieth. 168 European 
states pursued their ultimate ends of wealth and power through empire building with the 
purpose of dominating international trade relations. 169 By 1914, Europe and its colonies 
and former colonies together covered nearly 85% of the world's surface.l70 Since, the 
colonies have won political independence and become recognised as sovereign states in 
their own right. Throughout the developing world, many consider economic 
independence as a necessary dimension of the struggle for liberation. In the early 1970s it 
appeared that the South could mount their best effort and push for the redistribution of 
global economic power. The history of that effort is traced here. 
The development of an international trade regime under the GATT was a gradual process 
but developing countries where never in the driving seat at these negotiations. The 
promise that participation in multilateral decision-making held was that these institutions 
accepted the principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all states. Many of 
the arrangements that could be considered as victories, as noted above, were not 
successful in changing the regime orientation but merely codified or extended some of 
the preferential treatments some of the developing countries already enjoyed. The dispute 
resolution system was never a mechanism for effective change and the immediate focus 
was principally on tariff reduction negotiations rather than on the wider ends of 
development. The 'GATT stage' as it were, was an insignificant platform on which the 
countries of the South could cooperate in advancing their interest and their development 
compared to that of the larger context of international politics and the UN's General 
loR Gilpin, 1987: 264. 
109 Jacob Viner's often-cited dictum states that 'wealth and power are each proper and ultimate ends of 
national policy'. 
170 Denis Richards, An Illustrated History of Modern Europe, 1789-1974 (London: Longman, 1977) p. 212. 
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Assembly.17l Developing countries used this majority and cooperated to effect change 
conceiving a 'New International Economic Order'. 172 
As Milan Bujalic recounts, the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
was first raised in 1952, by Chile, and passed in a UN resolution only ten years later. The 
UN debate on the drafting of international covenants on human rights also dealt with the 
question, resolving to have a covenant for civil and political rights and another for 
economic, social and cultural rights. Action in other forums also strengthened the growth 
of political solidarity. The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 
had important repercussions. First among these was the continued unity of the Afro-Asian 
voting bloc in the UN system, and which led to the formation of the Group of 77. The 
creation of UNCT AD in 1964, as noted above, provided a forum for the G77 to formulate 
its economic demands and served to highlight the divisions between North and South. 
The prevailing view in the South was that existing economic order was working in the 
favour of the developed countries of the North. In the early 1950s the developing 
countries accounted for 32% of world trade, by 1972 this had been reduced to 17%.173 
Protective tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the developed countries impeded exporters of 
primary commodities, and attempts to mobilize domestic development in the South were 
not as successful as strategies of 'national capitalist' development had forecast. 
There were also cleavages within the South. Preferential systems, such as that of the 
Yaounde Convention and of the Commonwealth, were enjoyed by some and to the 
detriment of others. Even within these preferential agreements there were also regional 
and size differences. For example, Senegal, Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire accounted for 
about 60% of preferential EEC imports. 174 On the one hand these preference holders, 
171 At the international political level the circumstances were also changing: by 1960, with the entry of 18 
new members, developing countries were in the majority in the UN General Assembly. 
172 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order - Resolution 3201 of I May 
1974. See also, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed. The New International Economic Order: The North South Debate 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). 
173 Kamal Hossain, "Introduction" in Kamal Hossain ed. Legal Aspects of the New International Economic 
Order (London: Frances Pinter, 1980) p. 2. 
174 The figures relate to 1965. 
57 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
mainly the EEC African associates, but also countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 
were unlikely to give up their advantages. On the other hand countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina and Chile wanted existing schemes abolished before a new one was 
introduced. Part of their reasoning was that the existing preference arrangements 
continued the exploitative colonial structures. There were also more pragmatic views. For 
example, India was willing to forego its existing advantage in the Commonwealth system 
for better access in the generalised system of preferences. These contending views were 
thrashed out at meetings of the G77 in preparation for the UNCT AD conferences, 
particularly in Algiers in 1967, where agreement in principle was found and formulated 
as the Algiers Charter. I75 The G77 was able to secure a compromise position and build 
the solidarity of the South. The strategy of the G77 "was based on the assumption that 
concessions could only be wrested from the rich countries through collective action by 
developing countries.,,176 The implication was that this necessary collective action would 
be through UNCTAD rather than GATT. The North, in UNCTAD called Group B, was 
reluctant to accept UNCTAD as a proper negotiating forum and sought to restrict its 
scope. 
The Non-Aligned Movement was also a forum outside of the GAIT for cooperation in 
setting the economic agenda of the South. Preparatory meetings were also held to 
coordinate a common position to be advanced in UNCTAD, but the results ofUNCTAD 
II and UNCT AD III in 1972 were a disappointment for the South. l77 By the time of the 
Algiers Declaration of 1973, at the fourth Non-Aligned summit meeting held in Algeria, 
the programme for a New International Economic Order was taking shape: ''The heads of 
state or government recommend the establishment of effective solidarity organizations 
for the defense of the raw material producing countries such as the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries ... to recover natural resources and ensure increasingly 
substantial export earnings."J78 There was support for a unified South and harsh 
m Ougaard, 1984: 68. 
176 Watkins, 1991: 121. 
177 Ougaard, 1984: 68. 
178 As cited by Walden F. Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a new world economy (London: Zed Books, 
2004) p. 41. 
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condemnation of the North, its multinational companies and its control of the economic 
order. 179 
The North-South confrontation played out at the UN Special Session on development in 
1974, convened at the request of the South. Two declarations on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order were adopted. 180 By December 1974 the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States l81 was also adopted by the General Assembly as 
"an effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international 
economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of interests 
of developed and developing countries.,,182 The Charter passed with 120 in favour, 6 
against with 10 abstentions, showing clearly the balance of voting power enjoyed by the 
states of the South. 183 
Appeal to various economic rights and duties of states were abstract enough to meet with 
wide approval. Importantly, the right of states to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources went in tandem with the right of governments to choose their own economic, 
political, social and cultural systems without outside interference, also articulated in the 
Charter. The large majority of countries saw the Charter as introducing legal norms for 
development on a just and equitable basis. 
The essential norms of the NIEO reflected the assumption that Third World development 
should be the primary system goal. It went further than other international norms in that, 
based on the notion of equity, claims to special treatment for developing countries were 
necessary in order to have ajust international economic order. 184 The creation of an 
international social welfare system and the acceptance of the idea of international social 
179 Some of the most prominent leaders at Algiers included; Tito, Gandhi, Sadat, Senghor, Sihanouk, Nyere, 
Bourguiba, Makarios, Castro, Khaddaffi, Kaunda, Gowon, Mobuto, Bandaranaike, Faisal, Assad, Haile 
Selassi, Houphouet-Boigny. (Ougaard, 1984: 68) 
180 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order UNGA Res (3201), May 1 
1974 - and the Programme of Action thereof (3202). 
181 UNGA Resolution 3281 (XXIX), December 1974. 
181 As quoted by Hossain, 1980: 5. 
183 The six votes against were Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
184 Nawaz, 1980,pI16. 
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justice were also imperative. 18S The NIEO envisaged that equity applied not only to 
distribution but in fact justified the alteration of existing rules and the establishment of 
restrictions on entities like multinational companies, because the existing legal 
framework was unjust. 
Interestingly, president Alvarez of Mexico who had taken much of the initiative on the 
Charter emphasised the legal aspect that was missing from the contemporary order of the 
OA IT regime. More precisely he had wanted the Charter to be an instrument that could 
serve as a firm legal footing for the international economy. In his words: "We must 
strengthen the precarious legal foundations of the international economy. A just order 
and a stable world will not be possible until we create obligations and rights which 
protect the weaker States. Let us take economic co-operation out of the realm of goodwill 
and put into the realm of law. ,,186 This 'realm of law' is significant in that the institutions 
governing trade today are more legalistic than the Mexican President likely imagined, 
while at the same time international trade relations are still unjust. 
Analysis 
How can the 077 and the economic vision of a NIEO be assessed? In evaluating this 
question the first response is that it demonstrated the capacity for diplomatic cooperation 
by States of the South, especially within the UN system where they used their numerical 
superiority to effect. The disparities in wealth between the rich and poor were brought to 
world attention. Significantly, this was also an example of the weakness of the United 
Nations in that, aside from the passing of Declarations and the naming of various 
Development Decades, the NIEO envisioned never materialized. The appeals to 
economic rights and duties of states and the importance of a development orientation to 
international trade are noble ideas now accepted as largely non-controversial. Even at the 
time the principle of equity was not a subject of contention. UNCT AD had formalised the 
special and differential treatment that countries of the South enjoyed, though, as is clear 
from the cleavages that emerge in the 077, not by all countries. But, given the value 
185 Robert L. Rothstein, "Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: lessons from the NIEO and the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities," International Studies Quarterly, 28:3 (September 1984) p.311. 
186 As quoted by Bulajic, 1980: 50 
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attached to unity, the G77 could present a common face and solidarity in agreement on 
general principles. As Rothstein points out the South's demand for the fundamental 
restructuring of the world economy left little room for genuine bargaining. 187 Given the 
political nature of the G77, the success of a moderate, reformist approach to international 
economic relations was unlikely. As a result any attempt at North South negotiation was 
likely to be only an exchange of rhetoric. The situation in 1974 and 1975, according to 
Amuzegar was one where "the international economic community was badly wracked by 
discord, and engulfed in mutual distrust, bitterness and frustrations.,,188 
Turning to theory, from a mercantilist or realist approach, it is accepted that a state 
rationally seeks to increase their wealth and power. The NIEO can thus be assessed as a 
rational act aimed at aggrandizing either the state, or those who keep the government in 
power. 189 The list of developing country demands for a new economic order, and the 
political bloc driving it, are thus an example of traditional alliance among countries 
seizing new opportunities for material and political advantage, particularly through 
international organisations. The analysis suggests that the North therefore likely 
perceived in the NIEO a threat to their interests. The structural view, of which 
dependency theory had the greatest influence on developing countries at the time, saw a 
world economic system in need of new institutions since the imbalance between core and 
periphery was too deep-rooted to reform. The structure of inequality of the world 
economy unified the South, and the NIEO emphasised the norm of Third World 
development as the key norm. 190 In the final analysis the NIEO was not entirely coherent 
- adding together virtually all demands made by the developing countries in the 
previous two decades. 191 The NIEO demands for such an overhaul were too radical to 
lead to realistic or practical solutions. 
187 Rothstein, 1984: 326. 
188 Jahangir Amuzegar, "A Requiem for the North-South Conference," Foreign Affairs 56( 1), (October 
1977) p. 140. 
189 Murphy: 1983,56 
190 Rothstein, 1984: 313. 
191 Rothstein, 1984: 310-1 
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The assumption that the interests of the North were homogenous was also a 
miscalculation, as was the expectation that given the range of divergent interests the 
South could enjoy solidarity indefinitely. A balance between their unity and their national 
objectives was difficult to maintain. Over time and across issues different states of the 
G77 shifted their calculations of self-interest. The danger was that the North could cause 
a split in the South, particularly where cleavages that could be exploited already existed. 
Even on issues where a unified view was strong, such as in commodities, disagreement 
ensued. A case in point was the discussions on international commodity agreements and 
the Integrated Program for Commodities (IPC). Countries that potentially were the largest 
beneficiaries of the IPC preferred to maintain their dominant positions, such as Brazil in 
coffee and Malaysia in tin, rather than being locked into a negotiation position of G77 
unity. The US was also prepared to support some agreements, such as with Brazil on 
coffee, for 'foreign policy' reasons. l92 The North-South preference system also split unity 
by giving particular gains. For example, the Lome Convention between the EEC and 46 
African, Pacific and Caribbean states concluded in 1975. 193 The North South debate had 
by the end of the 1970s ended in stalemate. By September 1980194 North and South failed 
to arrive at even an agenda for further negotiations. The attempt to establish a New 
International Economic Order failed. 195 
3.5. Conclusion 
The economic gains made in world trade during the time of the GAIT were 
significant: between 1948 and 1997 world trade expanded from $124 billion to $10,772 
billion. 196 The countries of the South argued, using dependency theory, that the 
international economic structure created before the 1960s promoted the interests of 
industrialised countries and relegated poor countries to the periphery. From the 
perspective of multilateralism the GATT instrument was incomplete and as a treaty had 
192 Michael W. Doyle, "Stalemate in the North-South Debate: Strategies and the New International 
Economic Order," World Politics 35:3 (April 1983) p. 446. 
19.1 Doyle, 1983: 431. 
194 The II th Special Session of the United Nations. 
195 Rothstein, 1984: 307. 
190 Bello, 2004: 54. 
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no real enforcement mechanism for enforcing state obligations. The lack of a formal 
organization did not prevent regime creation as expectations converged on maximizing 
global welfare. The main preoccupation was removing barriers to trade, the norm of 
liberalization, but was applied selectively. The norm ofreciprocity was relaxed, usually 
in benefit to developing countries. This special and differential treatment was a result of 
reforms in the early GATT rounds, leading to the amendment of Article XVIII on 
'Governmental Assistance to Economic Development' . Colonial era ties also extended 
preferences. The successive GATT rounds were essentially negotiations to change rules 
and decision-making procedures. 197 As the number of developing countries signatory to 
GAIT increased this did not translate into substantive change in the GATT agenda. As 
one observer puts it, "Whatever the skills of negotiators from the South, for the most part 
they are like extras in the GATT stage: the show can't go on without them, but nobody is 
remotely interested in what they have to say.,,198 
Developing countries also looked outside of GATT to influence international economic 
relations in the trade regime. In the 1970s especially, the G77 and NAM served as blocs 
of solidarity, and UNCTAD as a new forum for development and trade. Significantly, by 
using the meetings of the UN and the principles of law, the language of the debate turned 
into a legal one of rights and duties. Despite the failure of the NIEO the right to 
development has since been accepted as a norm guiding the trade regime. As Zakariya 
explained in 1980, "The battle for economic self-determination and permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources was fought simultaneously ... on two fronts: concrete 
political and economic action by some of the developing states individually or 
collectively, and the theoretical refinement of the underlying legal concepts and 
principles within the United Nations system.'.J99 
197 Geneva (1947). Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950), Geneva (1956), Dillon (1960-1), Kennedy (1962-7), 
Tokyo (1973-9) and Uruguay (1986-94). 
198 Watkins, 1992: 36. 
199 Zakariya, 1980: 210. 
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CHAPTER 4 
International Trade under the WTO Regime 
This Chapter deals with the two aspects of cooperation under the WTO regime: whether 
countries of the South are able to set the agenda, secondly, how these countries can 
manage disputes within or outside the trade regime. Section 4.3. looks at the 
Development Agenda, as expressed in the Doha Round of negotiations, while Section 
4.2. considers specifically the North-South dynamic as it regards agricultural products 
and markets. The analysis comes together by balancing international development aims 
with the tensions that follow from national policy in the context of the WTO. Section 4.4. 
sets out the case study on cotton production and evaluates the prospects of the legal 
approach to dispute settlement under the WTO regime. The next section, Section 4.1. first 
deals briefly with political context before examining the WTO treaty and the regime it 
establishes. 
4.1. GATT Uruguay and the origin of the WTO 
4.1.1. Introduction - the post Cold War world 
While the trajectory of cooperative relations between states of the South formed 
one aspect of trade relations, the developed countries were also concerned with their own 
economic recovery following the oil crises of the 1970s, hyperinflation and rising 
unemployment, and at least by the early 1980s serious global recession.2oo The economic 
upheaval affected international investment and trade. GATT figures show world 
production and world export growth yearly at 6% and 8.5% over the period 1963-73, but 
fell to 2.5% and 3.5% between 1974_85.201 
The US, the EC countries, and Japan nevertheless dominated world trade. No doubt this 
was partly due to the liberalization and tariff reductions under GATT. From 1950 to 
200 The international monetary crisis of 1971 prompted the US to end the convertibility of the dollar into 
~~Id ~nd abandon the fixed exchange r~te sy.stem for currencies established at B.re~ton ~oods: 
" Gilbert R. Wmham. "An Interpretative History of the Uruguay Round NegotIatIOn" In Patnck F. 1. 
Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer, eds .• The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analvsis (New York: Springer, 2005) p.l O. 
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1975, merchandise trade among industrial countries grew at an average rate of 8% 
annually.202 Despite their categorization as the developed North it would be mistaken to 
simply assume that this translated to automatic unity. Japan, and its neighbours the Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) were able, through rapid technological advance, to 
dominate production. This led to calls, especially in the US, for protection against exports 
- either through tariffs or increasingly non-tariff barriers. Agreements for 'Voluntary 
Export Restraints' were reached, originally with Japan, allowing a new protectionism in 
the US. In Europe the enlargement of the European Community and its Common Market 
provided safeguards against manufactured imports, while the Common Agricultural 
Policy protected agricultural producers. In the face of economic interdependence, 
domestic interests became increasingly important in shaping strategic trade policies that 
were more akin to economic nationalism than liberal multilateralism. 
A common factor, but one which had different affects on political actors, was the 
structural change in the world economy. An important aspect was the relative decline of 
agriculture trade, falling from almost half of total world merchandise trade in 1950 to 
about 14% by the mid-1980s.203 This was matched by a corresponding rise in 
manufactures but especially in trade in services. Unprecedented developments in the hi-
tech and computer industries, and the effect of this in the financial services sector, 
emerged as key engines of new economic growth, as was noted in the previous chapter. 
These areas were not regulated under the existing GATT, which dealt primarily with 
trade in manufactured goods, and it was claimed that the changing reality of an 
increasingly complex global trade was making GATT obsolete.204 Sheila Page notes there 
were no important developing country interests addressed in the Tokyo Round (1973-
1979), in fact, the GATT was hardly involved at all in the final stages as the EC and US 
202 Bhala, 2005: 246. 
20:1 Winham. 2005: 10. 
204 Deepak Nayyar shows that as trade flows moved beyond the simple world of goods, so trade barriers 
moved beyond the simple world of tariffs. Deepak Nayyar, "Towards Global Governance," in Deepak 
Nayyar ed. Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 
10. 
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dominated.20S As trade tensions increased, particularly over agricultural issues of interest 
to the developing world but also not covered by GAIT, it seemed likely that the 
weaknesses of the multilateral trading regime would be entirely exposed unless a new 
round addressing new issues was launched. 
4.1.2. The Uruguay Round 
The eighth round of the GAIT multilateral negotiations, the Uruguay Round, was 
launched in 1986 and concluded in 1994. By the time it was concluded it was considered 
the most significant round and the most comprehensive - extending the rules governing 
international trade to include intellectual property, trade in services and agriculture. 
Initially there were serious concerns meaning that it was four years between the failed 
ministerial meeting in Geneva in 1982 and the actual start of the new round.206 One 
concern was that any new agreements would require better institutional mechanisms than 
GAIT provided. Another concern was that the Tokyo Round had resulted in too many 
'side agreements' binding only those that had accepted them, a problem of 'GATT a La 
carte', which negotiators sought to avoid as talks began in Uruguay.207 All of the original 
GA IT articles, member countries decided, would be open to review. A special 
negotiation on the 'functioning of the GATT system' (or FOGS) proposed a new 
"Multilateral Trade Organization" and later changed to the World Trade Organization. 
According to William Davey, there were no plans at the start of the Uruguay Round to 
create a new organization. As the negotiations continued the EC put forward a proposal in 
1990 based on (i) the need for a proper legal basis for GAIT; (ii) the desirability of a 
common institutional framework for the existing side agreements and (iii) the advantages 
of a single dispute settlement system. 208 The Marrakech Agreement Establishing the 
205 Sheila Page "Developing Country participation in multilateral trade negotiations: Developing Country 
perspectives and negotiating framework" in Asif H. Qureshi, ed. Perspectives in International Economic 
Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p.115. 
206 Kemal Dervis points to conflicts on agriculture as the main cause. Kemal Dervis. A Better 
Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance, and Reform (The Center for Global Development, 2005) p.167. 
207 Matsushita et ai, 2005: 6. 
208 William 1. Davey, "Institutional Framework" in Patrick F. 1. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael 
G. Plummer, eds. The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (New York: 
Springer, 2005) p.56. Davey, goes on to explain that the USA in 1991 saw a new organization as 
unnecessary and accepted the idea at the very end of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
66 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) formally replaced GAIT 1947209 and was 
opened for signature in April 1994. The WTO Agreement entered into force 1 January 
1995. According to legal scholars not only is it at more than 25 000 pages the longest 
agreement ever concluded, it is also a global framework agreement creating a multi-
layered legal system.210 
4.1.3. The WTO Regime 
Like the GAIT, the WTO is the embodiment of a regime and has institutional 
foundations, though now explicitly set out, making the WTO a fully-fledged international 
organization. The functions of the WTO are contained in Article III: providing a forum 
for negotiations; to administer the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); to 
administer the Trade Review Policy Mechanism; and to cooperate with the IMF and 
World Bank to achieve greater coherence in global economic policymaking.2II The three 
main bodies of the WTO are the Ministerial Conference, which is the representative body 
meeting at least every two years (Article IV: 1), the General Council as the executive 
body with representatives from all Members (Article IV:2), and the Secretariat in charge 
of administrative affairs under the guidance of the Director-General (Article VI). 
The WTO differs in a number of important respects from the GAIT but the basic norms 
remain the same: non-discrimination between countries (the most favoured nation 
treatment, MFN), non-discrimination between imported and domestic goods (the national 
treatment clause), and transparency. There are exceptions. On MFN, there are the 
preferential tariffs, as discussed above, but also provisions for regional arrangements. The 
exception for customs unions and free trade areas was allowed based on the premise that 
regional integrations will eventually lead to global free trade.212 On National Treatment, 
domestic subsidies are permitted, though it is not clear whether subsidies provide a 'fair 
advantage' to developing countries, but an 'unfair advantage' to developed ones. The 
209 The provisions of GATT 1947 continue in force as annexed to the WTO agreement. 
210 Peters mann, 1997: 11-13. 
211 Davey, 2005: 57-60. 
212 Horst Siebert, The World Economy (London: Routledge, 1999) p.272. 
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main aim however is the reduction of trade barriers and the basic principle, like that of 
the GAIT regime, remains liberalization. 
In contrast to the GAIT of the Tokyo Round where countries could opt out on specific 
agreements, the WTO Agreement is a "single undertaking" - all the provisions apply to 
all members.213 For this reason the WTO Agreement incorporates a whole package of 
Agreements included as Annexes.214 The agreements are complex and the next section 
looks only at the major characteristics of the more significant ones, particularly the "new" 
subjects: services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, and agriculture. The unifying 
focus throughout is the relationship between North and South, which in Section 4.2. is 
considered in detail as it regards agriculture. 
4.1.4. The WTO Agreements 
• Annex 1 contains the obligations of GATT, as GAIT 1994, and also includes the 
multilateral agreements such as the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures. 
• Annex IB contains the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
• Annex 1 C the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) 
• Annex 2 the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU) 
GATS 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the framework agreement that 
in effect puts services under an international free trade regime. During the Uruguay 
Round the focus was primarily on financial services, basic telecommunications, maritime 
transport and audiovisual services.215 The substance of the agreement deals with 
obligations such as the MFN requirement and national treatment clauses, and with the 
213 Annex 4 contains the 'plurilateral agreements', which are in fact optional. 
214 Davey, 2005: 57. 
2J5 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and policy of International Economic Relations 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000) p.3] O. 
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various exemptions. Again, there is flexibility for developing countries, but this does not 
mask that the inclusion of liberalisation of services as part of the WTO framework was a 
result of the insistence of major developed countries.216 
TRIPs 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
builds on previous intellectual property treaties and extends the minimum standard 
requirements to all members.z17 As with the other agreements there are the MFN and 
national treatment clauses, but also specific clauses on copyrights, trademarks, patents, 
industrial design, software and geographical indications. There is also a requirement for 
reform of administrative and legal systems to make effective their implementation. The 
early discussion on intellectual property, back in the 1980s, met with resistance from 
developing countries since they had little to gain and a lot to lose: they were unlikely to 
have new patents of their own and would have to pay for patents they were already 
accessing free. 2lg The 'theft' of intellectual property - through counterfeiting, software 
piracy, and other means prompted extensive, and ultimately successful, lobbying by 
corporate and other groups. For example, the American pharmaceutical industry and 
software companies in particular pushed for protection of research. As Jagdish Bhagwati 
explains, these companies "muscled their way into the WTO and turned into a royalty-
collection agency simply because the WTO can apply trade sanctions.,,219 In examining 
the balance between the patent protection of pharmaceutical companies and access to life-
saving drugs in developing countries, Bhagwati concludes that the TRIPS should not be 
part of the WTO at all. 
4.1.5. The WTO and Dispute Settlement 
WTO disputes are settled through the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).220 The DSU has also been called the "crown jewel" in the WTO system.221 This is 
216 Das. 2003: 55. 
217 Das, 2003: 56. There is discretion for countries to provide for higher levels of protection. 
218 Jackson, 2000: 311. 
219 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 183. 
220 Officially the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of 
the WTO Agreement. 
221 Bhala, 2005: 1149. 
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a legally prescribed and court-like or juridical procedure available only to WTO Member 
states. The process, each stage with specific deadlines, can be divided into three parts: 
consultation, Panel or Appellate procedure, and enforcement. 
Firstly, under Article 4 of the DSU, the parties to the dispute are meant to sort out their 
differences bilaterally before engaging the WTO. This is the diplomatic or political 
dispute settlement stage. If unsuccessful, the formal juridical process begins by the 
complaining party taking their grievance to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is 
constituted of all members of the WTO, and requesting a Panel. 
The DSB then establishes and mandates a Panel of three experts to give recommendations 
and report to the DSB. Either party can appeal the ruling to the Appellate Body - a 
bench of three drawn from a total of seven experts. This second decision-making level, 
Article 17, is one of the main improvements on the GATT system. 222 The right to appeal 
adds to the fairness of the dispute proceedings in the WTO. The DSB then 
"automatically" approves the Panel (or Appellate Body) report. The negative consensus 
rule applies - all members must oppose the findings of a dispute to block the adoption 
of the report. This is an improvement on the GATT system where veto procedures were 
often used to block rulings. 
Once adopted by the DSB the recommendations and rulings of the Panel are binding. 
The respondent must then take corrective measures promptly and notify the DSB how it 
is complying, otherwise the complaining party is authorised by Article 22 to take 
retaliatory action and impose 'trade sanctions' .223 The WTO therefore is a legalistic body, 
but has limited power in that it relies on members for enforcement.224 The legal order 
nevertheless binds and disciplines the foreign trade policy of individual Members. As 
Shaffer, writing in 2003, records, "All states, even the most powerful ones, have 
responded to WTO judgements by modifying domestic regulation and practices, or, in the 
222 Stoll and Schorkopf, 2006: 78. 
223 Stoll and Schorkopf, 2006: 92. 
m Bhagwati, 2004: 105. 
70 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
few cases where domestic politics blocked modification, have accepted the resulting 
sanctions. ,,225 
In conclusion, the settling of disputes under WTO law is considered "a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system" and "essential to 
the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between 
the rights and obligations of Members.,,226 International trading relations under the WTO 
have been governed increasingly through law. In the first eight years, 279 formal 
complaints were filed and 68 panel and Appellate body reports adopted. All countries, 
North and South, are initiating more legal complaints against one another.227 
4.1.6. Conclusion 
At face value, the achievements of the Uruguay Round, in comparison to previous 
efforts under GATT, are impressive. Liberalization widened to previously excluded areas 
such as agriculture and services. Institutional mechanisms were strengthened, creating a 
member driven organization operating by consensus. Most importantly an unprecedented 
binding dispute settlement system was introduced. The institutional problems of the 
GAIT system were solved and a clear legal basis for the organization and its activities 
established. 
However, it would be short-sighted to consider the various agreements without returning 
to the politics. Such an analysis indicates that developed countries benefit more from the 
WTO than developing countries. Sylvia Ostry228 explains the "North-South grand 
bargain" that was struck to create the WTO: the developing countries would take on the 
new, but gradual, commitments on intellectual property protection and liberalizing trade 
in services, which largely favoured the developed countries, who in return would grant 
enhanced access to rich world markets for agricultural products and textiles and clothing. 
m Shaffer, 2003: 2-3. 
226 Article 3.1, 2 of the DSU 
m Shaffer, 2003: 3. 
228 Sylvia Ostry was a former Canadian trade negotiator. Sylvia Ostry, "Trading for development: how to 
assist poor countries" in Mike Moore, ed., Doha and Beyond: The future of the multilateral trading system 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 97. 
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So while GATS and TRIPS are now in effect, developing countries are left clamouring 
for the promised payoff. These are the seeds of the present North-South discontent229, as 
evidenced today in the stop-start dynamic of the most recent trade talks, the Doha Round. 
4.2. North South agenda: Agriculture, subsidies and markets 
4.2.1. Agriculture 
From the perspective of many countries of the South, but particularly that of the 
net agricultural exporters, various forms of protection for agricultural products had for 
too long escaped the discipline of the trade regime. Agriculture is by far the most heavily 
protected sector in international trade. The policy of countries of the North provided 
domestic support for their farmers and export subsidies for their produce; while keeping 
out Southern goods from their market with high tariffs and also non-tariff barriers. In the 
1980s these divisions in agricultural trade were a source of considerable tension. 
According to OECD figures, "of the 82 disputes submitted to the dispute settlement 
process between 1980 and 1990,60 percent concerned agriculture.,,23o 
Agricultural trade is not just a North-South issue. Talks on agricultural trade reform have 
been dominated by the United States and Europe who accounted in the mid-1990s for 
about two thirds of world agricultural trade. 231 But agriculture is of far greater 
significance to countries of the South, where it accounts for on average two thirds of total 
employment and a quarter of their GDP.232 Trade in agriculture is also important for the 
WTO in that it may actually be a make-or-break issue: firstly because agriculture has not 
gone through any significant liberalization before, and secondly because the promise of 
229 The wider social context is crucially important. The rising tide of opposition from social movements 
from North and South to 'globalization', as characterized by the substantial benefits of liberalized trade 
going to the developed world, especially the corporations which are engaged in a 'silent takeover', while 
those living in poverty continue to bear the costs. See Noreena Hertz, The Silent Takeover: Global 
Capitalism and the Death of Democrac,v (London: Heinemann, 2(01). 
230 Melaku Geboye Desta, The law of international trade in agricultural products: from GATT 1947 to the 
WTO agreement on agriculture (The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 2002) p. 9. 
231 See Appendix I for exports of agricultural products in 1990, 2000 and 2005. The USA and the EU are 
dominant. Appendix 2 shows the ten biggest exporters as a percentage of the world total. 
m Watkins, 1992: 41. However, as Appendix 3 shows, for many countries of the South agriculture trade 
has in the years 2000 to 2005 in fact decreased in importance as a share of their respective exports. 
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liberalized agricultural trade was one of the principal reasons why states of the South 
joined the WTO. 233 
The start of a new round, that would include rules governing agriculture trade, was 
delayed by years. The main cause of division at the 1982 Ministerial Meeting was the 
opposition of developing countries to a new negotiation that would include services and 
other new issues before there was progress on agriculture.234 Once the negotiations began 
in 1986 as the Uruguay Round, agriculture was a major topic of discussion, and being 
addressed comprehensively for the first time. During the round the EC's Common 
Agricultural Policy became the 'gatekeeper' issue, holding up a successful conclusion of 
the negotiations.235 A separate Agreement on Agriculture was eventually adopted, 
committing WTO members to liberalise the trade in agriculture. The broader context was 
the 'Grand Bargain' where the North received agreement on services and intellectual 
property (GATS and TRIPs), and in exchange the South were granted improved terms of 
entry to their agricultural markets, and end to textile and apparel quotas. 236 The details of 
the Agriculture Agreement are considered below. 
Agreement on Agriculture 
The Agreement on Agriculture aims 'to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural 
trading system' by 'correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world 
agricultural markets' .237 The Agreement on Agriculture introduces basic obligations on 
three pillars: Market Access, Domestic Support and Export Subsidies. In general terms, 
the commitments were designed to increase market access for agricultural products and to 
reduce domestic support (Article 6) and export subsidy expenditures (Article 9).238 
Special and Differential treatment was still to be given to developing countries (Article 
m Arvind Panagariya, 'Liberalizing Agriculture', Foreign Affairs, Special Edition, (December 2005) 
234 Winham, 2005: 6. 
m Fred C. Bergsten, "Rescuing the Doha Round," Foreign Affairs Special Edition, (December 2005) p.22. 
236 The quota system was part of the 1974 Multi Fibre Agreement, the new one under the WTO the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC Agreement) 
237 Agreement on Agriculture, Preamble 2 and 3. 
238 Rajesh Aggarwal, 'Dynamics of agriculture negotiations in the World Trade Organization', Journal of 
World Trade 39:4, (August 2005) p. 741. 
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15).239 They were to implement the agreement over a ten-year period (2004); developed 
countries in six (2000). 
Market access 
In order to increase market access WTO members agree to do away with non-tariff 
barriers240 ('converting' them to bound tariffs) and to begin to reduce existing tariffs - on 
average, 36% for developed countries241 and 24% for developing countries. The financial 
value of export subsidies were to be reduced on average by 36% for developed countries 
and 24% for developing countries. Developing countries were granted special and 
differential treatment. Yet, they begin at a disadvantage. Unlike developed countries, only 
a few used non-tariff barriers to restrict market access, so their bound tariff levels are 
lower than developed countries. The high protection prevailing during the base period 
(1986-88) has meant only modest reductions. 
Table 3: Agricultural Tariff Reduction Commitments made during the Uruguay Round 
Least 
Tariff Reduction Commitments Developed Developing Developed 
countries countries Countries 
Average cut for all agricultural 36 % 24% 0 products 
Minimum cut per agricultural product 15 % 10% 0 
6 years, 10 years, N/a Period for phasing in the cuts 1995-2000 1995-2004 
Source: Matsushita et ai, 2003: J 36; Bhala, 2005: 257. 
239 Least Developed Countries were not required to undertake any reduction commitments. 
240 Non-tariff barriers "include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import 
prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state trading enterprises, 
voluntary export restraints and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties" (Article 4.2 of 
Agreement on Agriculture) 
241 Between 1995 and 2000 
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Domestic support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes 
Under WTO rules242, domestic subsidies are identified by "Boxes": green (permitted), 
amber (slow down - i.e., be reduced), and red (forbidden). The Agriculture Agreement 
has no Red Box but there is a Blue Box (an exemption from the rule that all subsidies 
linked to production must be reduced). There are also exemptions for developing 
countries (sometimes called an "S&D Box"). 
Certain types of subsidies, listed in the various annexes, are exempt243: 
• "Amber box" subsidies which are permissible but subject to limits; 
• "Green box" subsidies such as for domestic food aid and research; 
• "Blue box" subsidies aimed at encouraging production such as rural, and 
development programmes. 
The 'Amber Box': For agriculture, all domestic support measures considered to distort 
production and trade (with some exceptions) fall into the Amber Box. The Agreement on 
Agriculture requires a reduction in the total value of these measures. 
The 'Green Box': In order to qualify for the "Green Box", a subsidy must not distort 
trade, or at most cause minimal distortion. These subsidies have to be government-funded 
and must not involve price support. One example is the subsidy given to environmental 
protection and regional development programmes. "Green box" subsidies, provided they 
comply and are decoupled from production levels or prices, are allowed without limits. 
They also include environmental protection and regional development programmes 
The 'Blue Box': Phase 1: The Blue Box is an exemption from the general rule that all 
subsidies linked to production must be reduced or kept within defined minimal ("de 
minimis") levels. It covers payments directly linked to acreage or animal numbers?44 
242 http://www.wto.org/englishltratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgmdI3_boxes_e.htm 
243 Matsushita et ai, 2003: 136. 
244 At the moment, the Blue Box is a permanent provision of the agreement. Some countries want it 
scrapped because the payments are only partly decoupled from production, or they are proposing 
commitments to reduce the use of these subsidies. Others say the Blue Box is an important tool for 
supporting and reforming agriculture, and for achieving certain "non-trade" objectives. 
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Domestic support programmes affecting prices are to be reduced - by 20% for developed 
states and 13.3% for developing. 245 
Table 4: Domestic Agricultural Support Reduction Commitments made during the 
Uruguay Round 
Least 
Domestic AgricuituralSupp6rf Developed Developing DevelQj?ed 
Reduction Commitments countries countries Countries 
Aggregate Measure of Support 20% 13.3% 0 
6 years, 10 years, N/a Period for phasing in the cuts 1995-2000 1995-2004 
Source: Matsushita et ai, 2003: 136. 
Export Subsidies 
Article 9.1 sets out the categories of export subsidies subject to reduction commitments. 
The financial value of export subsidies are to be reduced on average by 36% for 
developed countries and 24% for developing countries. According to Panagariya's study 
in 2005 on liberalizing agriculture, only 25 WTO members reported having any export 
subsidies, and all applied only to a few commodities. The conclusion reached is that 
"they are no longer a major source of trade distortion, at least in aggregate.,,246 
Table 5: Export Subsidy Reduction Commitments made during the Uruguay Round 
Export Subsidy Reduction 
Commitments 
Average reduction by value 
(Financial outlay) 
Average reduction by volume 
(subsidized quantities) 
Source: Matsushita et ai, 2003: 136. 
245 Least Developed Countries are not included. 
24(, Panagariya, 2005: 58. 
Developed 
countries 
36 % 
21 % 
Least 
Developing Developed 
countries Countries 
24% 0 
14 % N/a 
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Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture sets as "the long-term objective substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection ... " including the phasing out of all 
forms of export subsidies. That article also established a Committee on Agriculture to 
review the progress made and is seen as a built in mandate for reform. 
There has been little action since the Agreement for further reforming agricultural trade. 
Significant progress is also hampered by the already high tariff rates that are the base 
rates for beginning future reductions. The reluctance to liberalize substantially has not 
only stalled trade talks on a number of occasions, but by sidelining a key issue of concern 
to the developing countries, threatens the credibility of the WTO regime. The dispute 
settlement mechanism that could be used to clarify the rules has been under-utilized. The 
Agreement on Agriculture also included a "peace clause" (Article 13) preventing states 
from initiating dispute settlement proceedings on agriculture for the first nine years, this 
ended in 2004. In the final section of this Chapter the implications of this legal route will 
be explored. The next section continues with agriculture trade and looks at the domestic 
and regional aspect of North South trade relations. 
4.2.2. Developed world -subsidies 
The United States and the EU are both major subsidizers of agriculture and 
provide considerable domestic support - the EU, more than the United States. Japan, 
Switzerland, Norway and South Korea also maintain high protection. The EU, with 
France as the biggest beneficiary, has been gradually reforming its Common Agriculture 
Policy. In 2002 a deal was struck between France and Germany to increase EU farm 
subsidies by 1 % per year until 2013, from its base in 2006.247 Nonetheless, Europe's 
farmers received a record €48.5bn (£33bn) in subsidies from the CAP in 2005, a jump of 
more than 11 % year on year. 248 According to data from the European Commission, the 
CAP in 2005 was 46% of the ED's entire budget. The result of the commitment to the 
CAP on European trade policy is significant in that on holding to its position it squanders 
247 'Schroder and Chirac in Farm Deal' Financial Times, 6 November 2002. 
248 Heather Stewart, 'Huge rise in subsidies for Europe's farmers' The Observer, 24 September 2006. 
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its bargaining leverage. Put simply, because it has no comparative advantage in 
agriculture the EU has no substantive interest in agricultural reciprocity. 249 
The United States increased domestic support under its Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002. Over the next ten years spending on commodity programmes 
would be $19 billion a year. 250 The US is a demandeur of elimination of export subsidies 
given mainly by the EU but continues to use export support programmes, such as export 
credits, guarantees and insurance programmes. The US, although provider of 
considerable domestic support, has maintained an overall liberalizing posture in the 
negotiations by indicating its willingness to reduce its domestic support substantially 
provided that other subsidizers match its level of support and it got increased access for 
its products in all markets -both developed and developing. The EU is reluctant to 
eliminate export subsidies, but claims it's willing to reduce them. 
The industrialized countries stress the multifunctionality of agriculture. Agriculture is not 
only about trade but plays a role in maintenance of rural communities, and allays 
concerns about food security and food safety, and animal welfare. The EU for example 
has linked the farm subsidy to issues such as sustainable development and protection of 
the environment. This group is in favour of slow and gradual process of reforms in 
agriculture sector. There is also some support from developing countries of the African, 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) Group, which were dependent on the preferential 
schemes of access for their products mainly in the markets of EU. 
Table 6: Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies (1998) 
Total Amount by all WTO members $ 5.4 billion 
-Ojwhich EU $ 4.95 billion 
-OJ which Switzerland $ 292 million 
-OJ which the USA $ 147 million 
Source: Panagariya, 2005: 59. 
249 Bhagwati, 2005: II. 
250 Martin Wolf, 'Doha must weed out the world's farming subsidies' Financial Times, 6 November 2002. 
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4.2.3. Developing world - market access 
In the words of former GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland, the domestic 
support for agriculture in the North "led to wasteful surpluses like the 'butter mountains' 
and 'wine lakes' ... ,,251 The result has been that most developing countries have not been 
free to enjoy their comparative advantage in agriculture. As Sutherland goes on to say, 
these are wasteful surpluses "amidst the poverty, and sometimes famine, in the 
developing world whose farmers have been shut out of the world market by industrialized 
countries' subsidies". 252 
Many countries have not been able to diversify from their concentration on primary 
products, and have been bypassed by the technological advances that led to the 
spectacular export-led growth of the NICs. According to the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa, (UNECA) Africa has hardly benefited from the boom in manufactured 
exports.253 In fact, Africa's share in world merchandise exports fell from 6.3% in 1980 to 
2.5% in 2000. 
Some developing countries do not have substantial export interest in agriculture.254 As in 
other states, agriculture goes beyond an activity that is purely governed by market rules 
because it involves a high proportion of the population and where problems of poverty 
alleviation, food security and livelihood security are very serious. Since these countries 
cannot match the domestic support given in some countries of the North, their position is 
also to demand substantial reduction in domestic support and export subsidies. In terms 
of reciprocity, they are conservative in undertaking tariff reductions of their own, but will 
join with others in demanding liberalization of domestic support and export subsidies. 
On a final note it is worth considering that a more pragmatic approach to negotiations 
may be more useful than relying on a North-South dyad. Going beyond political 
solidarity to consider the identification of economic interest, for instance as producer 
251 As quoted by Geboye Desta, 2002: 8. 
252 As quoted by Geboye Desta, 2002: 8. 
m Accessed online http://www.uneca.org/cfml2004/ministeriaLstatement.htm (24 May 2004) 
254 Not an organized group but countries with these positions include: India, Pakistan, Turkey, Zimbabwe, 
Nicaragua, Kenya, Nigeria, Dominican Republic, Honduras, EI Salvador, Venezuela, Philippines, Indonesia 
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groups, may be a new dynamic in how states pursue their trade relations. For example, 
the Cairns Group255 includes the major exporters of agricultural products - both 
developed and developing countries, and pursues aggressive liberalization. 
4.2.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the two opposing views in the North South debate can be 
summarised. Most developing countries, except for ones that import food, push the 
dismantling of farm subsidies in rich countries and further market access via agricultural 
tariff reduction. Developed countries of the North want to improve their own access to 
developing countries' markets for industrial goods and services, and are reluctant to first 
dismantle the protections they have historically maintained in their agricultural sector. 
The United States and the European Union, the key players, face even more formidable 
domestic obstacles to making essential concessions than they did in the past. In the Doha 
Round negotiations, the fundamental structure of the Agreement on Agriculture was not 
challenged. But neither was the framework for further liberalization followed. Without 
the apparent divisions in agriculture being faced, no progress can be expected. But the 
issue is more complex that a North-South analysis reveals and consensus has been 
building on the needs for development. In many ways liberalization in agriculture trade is 
the key if a development orientation for the WTO is to be achieved. The developing 
countries have kept the issue at the top of the current agenda. 
4.3. The Doha Development Agenda 
4.3.1. The WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha, Qatar in November 2001 
The Doha Round of trade negotiations launched by ministers at Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001 was geared specifically to address the concern of countries of the South 
and to help poor countries in what was labelled a new "Development Round.,,256 The 
255 A group of agriculture products exporting countries led by Australia and comprising Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Thailand. The group was constituted at a meeting in Cairns, Australia during the Uruguay 
Round from which it derives its name. 
256 Lenore Sek, "World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda" Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress (RL32060) 2004. 
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original deadline for completion was 31 December 2004. According to the World Bank, 
a successful Doha Round would raise global income by more than $500 billion a year by 
2015, over 60% going to poor countries and helping pull 144 million people out of 
poverty. 257 
Prioritising development concerns in trade negotiations, one of the main topics under the 
Doha Agenda has been the liberalization of agricultural trade, such as the reduction (or 
elimination) of farm tariffs and subsidies maintained by developed countries.258 Industrial 
tariffs were to be reduced and the market in services opened up. Four new areas -
competition, investment, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation 
(the 'Singapore issues ') - were also to be negotiated. 259 These issues were of less 
concern to the countries of the South than the development and agriculture aspects of the 
reforms, which many felt had not advanced since the 'Grand Bargain' of the WTO. At the 
heart of the development agenda lies a continuation of the GAIT provisions of Special 
and Differential treatment in favour of developing countries. 
WTO Members could build consensus in Doha on broad principles, e.g., to reduce and 
eventually eliminate agricultural subsidies, but could not further agree on how these 
principles would be implemented and attained in subsequent negotiations. The chances of 
a successful outcome of the Round were largely seen as contingent upon a breakthrough 
in agriculture negotiations. 
4.3.2. The WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003 
The breakthrough in agriculture negotiations did not materialize. Prior to the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference, at a mini-Ministerial meeting held on Canada in July 
2003, the EU and the United States attempted to resolve their differences in their 
seemingly diametrically opposite positions, especially on market access. The EU and the 
257 'The WTO under fire' Economist 18 September 2003. 
25R Ross P. Buckley, ed. The WTO and the Doha Round: the changing face of World Trade (The 
Hague; London: Kluwer Law International, 2003). See also ASIL Insight, accessed online 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/12/insights051229 .html 
259 'The WTO under fire' Economist 18 September 2003. 
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US came out with their joint proposal on 13 August 2003.260 The joint proposal was not 
received well by other Members, as it offered no real substance. 261 It showed no 
commitment to restricting domestic support for agriculture. As noted above, the US farm 
Security Act of 2002 and the EU's CAP negotiation earlier in 2003 had entrenched 
continued farm support. 
The G-20 alliance 
As a reaction to EU-US proposal, which ignored the position of developing countries, a 
new alliance led by Brazil, China, India and South Africa formed on 20 August 2003 in 
run up to the Cancun Ministerial Meeting.262 Many developing country Members of the 
agricultural exporting countries, the Cairns Group, and other developing countries which 
had expressed certain reservations on opening up of their own markets came together to 
make a counter proposa1.263 Celso Amorim, the Brazilian Trade Minister, said that it 
represented over half the world's population and over two-thirds of its farmers. The group 
comprised 23 developing countries at Cancun: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, South Africa and 
Venezuela.264 This group was later named the G-20. 
The negotiations on agriculture were largely viewed as a contest between the EU-US on 
one side and the G-20 alliance on the other.265 Both the US and the EU held meetings 
with the G-20 separately but the discussions did not progress beyond reiteration of their 
respective positions. Thus, the conventional view is that the Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun collapsed mainly due to the irreconcilable differences between rich and poor 
260 Accessed online www .agtradepolicy.org/outputlresource/EC-US-Joint_text_13_Aug_20m.pdf 
261 Razneem Sally, "Whither the WTO? A progress report on the Doha Round" Center for Trade Policy 
Analysis, Cato Institute, 2003. 
262 Jagdish Bhagwati, "From Seattle to Hong Kong," Foreign Affairs Special Edition, December 2005. 
263 WTO, WTIMIN(m)W/6. The major difference in the G-20 proposal from the EU-US proposal was 
with respect to the tariff reduction formula applicable to developing countries. 
264 Post Cancun, Colombia, Costa Pica, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Guatemala and Peru left the Group but 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania joined as new Members. Guatemala has since joined the Group again. 
265 Pranav Kumar, "Will they divide the G20 too? Accessed online 
( www.thehindubusinessline.coml2004/04130stories/2004043000021.htm) 
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countries' position on the reduction of farm subsidies. 266 Two days into the Conference, 
over 90 countries signed a letter saying they were not prepared to enter discussion on the 
'Singapore issues' the North, but particularly the EU and Japan wanted.267 The "draft 
Cancun Ministerial text,,268 was tabled, but the conference was declared closed even 
before the commencement of discussion on the Agriculture section of this document. 
The United States and the EU did not engage in real negotiations on agriculture at 
Cancun. Instead, they unsuccessfully endeavoured to split the G-20 by exploiting the 
differences in positions of its members. Granted, it was an alliance of diverse interests. 
For example India maintains high tariffs and never supported opening markets, while 
Brazil, as a competitive exporter supports liberalization of trade. American trade 
representative Robert Zoellick pointed out: "Key mid-level developing countries 
employed the rhetoric of resistance as a tactic both to put pressure on developed countries 
and to divert attention from their own trade barriers. India's average bound agricultural 
tariff is 112 per cent, Egypt's 62 per cent and Brazil's 37 per cent - compared with a US 
average of 12 per cent.,,269 
Walden Bello notes: "Not even the most optimistic developing country came to Cancun 
expecting some concessions from the big rich countries in the interest of development. 
Most developing country governments came to Cancun with a defensive stance. The big 
challenge was not that of forging a historic New Deal but that of preventing the US and 
the EU from imposing new demands on the developing countries while escaping any 
multilateral disciplines on their trade regimes.'.270 
266 Accessed online http://www.asil.org/insights/200S/08IinsightsOS082S.html 
2(,7 'The WTO under fire' Economist 18 September 2003. 
268 WTO, Job(03)I1S0/Rev.2, Annex I 
2(,9 Robert Zoellick, 'America will not wait for the won't-do countries,' Financial Times. 22 September 
2003. 
270 Walden Bello, 'The meaning of Cancun' Focus on Trade 93. September 2003. See also Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, The development round of trade negotiations in the aftermath ofCancun. Report for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat prepared by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton with the Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue. (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004). 
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The emphasis on a North-South division, as in the GAIT, led again to a stalemate in 
negotiations. The US-EU inability to negotiate with the G-20 was a decisive factor, but it 
also meant that solidarity positions prevailed over interests in global agricultural reform. 
Jagdish Bhagwati sees the emergence of the G-20 as the central breakthrough of Cancun 
and a triumph for developing countries. The terms of the negotiations are in his view now 
set by a new Group of 5: the US, the EU, Brazil, India, and Australia.271 
Ever since the Cancun debacle, the Doha Round has made little progress. On agriculture, 
negotiations started with a meeting between the G-20 ministers and the EU Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy in Brazil on 12 December 2003, but only restated the 
positions of G-20 and the EU. Aggarwal suggests it was nevertheless an important 
milestone as the EU recognized the G-20 as a negotiating entity.272 
The establishment of "Doha Work Program" in August 2004, welcomed as a 
breakthrough, was nothing more than a basic roadmap for future negotiations, and failed 
to generate any substantial achievements. Developed and developing countries have 
diverging positions on three major issues, i.e., agricultural protection, tariff reduction, and 
liberalization of trade in services. But developed countries will not unilaterally take 
action on agriculture without reciprocal concessions from developing countries on 
industrial tariffs and services. Developing countries are also reluctant to make first move 
until they secure material commitments from developed countries on agricultural 
protection.273 
In July 2005, thirty major WTO Members met in a mini-Ministerial Meeting Dalian, 
China. The US and the EU accepted a proposal on the basic formula of agricultural tariff 
reduction from the G-20. But at the end of the Dalian meeting, the WTO Director-
General Supachai Panitchpakdi expressed "grave concern" on the status of Doha 
271 Bhagwati, 2005. Australia is representative of the Cairns Group. 
m Aggarwal, 2005. 
m Alan Beattie, 'G8 Mood and Doha Talks 'Show Disconnect,' Financial Times, 10 July 2005. 
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negotiations.274 As discussions continued in Geneva, major players did not move from 
their original positions: the EU refused to undertake actual cuts in agricultural tariffs; the 
US declined to reduce farm subsidies; key developing countries, such as Brazil, India and 
China, resisted making any substantial concessions on industrial tariffs and services in the 
face of the EU and the US' lack of commitments in the agricultural sector. 275 
In October 2005, the US made an offer of agricultural trade liberalization reform 
addressing the three pillars (tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies).276 Some EU 
Member States, in particular France, prevented the EU from making similar moves. The 
French President, Jacques Chirac, threatened to "block a world trade deal" if the EU's 
concessions went beyond the CAP. 277 The EU was divided between France and its allies, 
and the more accommodating United Kingdom and Nordic countries.278 
4.3.3. The WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005 
The expectation was that the Hong Kong meeting would deliver a face-saving 
pact with an accent on development. At the end of the negotiations WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy observed that the Doha Round was "back on track," and especially 
that there has been a "rebalancing in the favor of developing countries.,,279 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration280 included, inter alia, deadlines for the 
elimination of agricultural export subsidies (2013) and cotton export subsidies (2006). 
Further negotiations in agricultural and non-agricultural market access were to be 
established within four months. The development dimension foresees duty and quota-free 
274 'Dalian: Ministers Recommit to Doha Round, But Skepticism Abounds, Bridges Week(r Trade News 
Digest 9(25), 13 July 2005. 
275 Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, 'Prospects for WTO Gloomier as Talks End', Financial Times, 27 
July 2005. 
276 Rob Portman, America's Proposal to Kick-Start the Doha Trade Talks, Financial Times, 10 October 
2005. 
277 George Parker, 'Chirac Fires Warning Shot on Trade Deal in Defense of Farm Subsidies', Financial 
Times, 28 October 2005. 
278 Bhagwati (2005) also suggests that the 10% unemployment level in France leads to popular opposition 
to opening markets to foreign competition. 
279 WTO, Summary of December 18,2005, Day 6: Ministers Agree on Declaration that 'Puts Round Back 
on Track,' http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto_e/minisCe/min05_e/min05_18dec_e.htm 
280 Bridges Daily Update on the Sixth Ministerial Conference, Issue 4, 16 December 16 2004, 
(http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/wto_daily/16_December/en051216.htm.) 
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access for at least 97% of products originating from the LDCs to be provided by 2008. 
Developing countries had originally been opposed to the list (Annex C), of detailed items 
for future liberalization in services, the position held by the EU and the US. Services was 
linked to the main text of the declaration and open to further negotiation and supported by 
the developing countries. 
Firstly, a deadline for the elimination of agricultural export subsidies (including export 
credits, guarantees, and insurances) was set to the end of 2013. Developing countries 
relinquished their initial position (elimination of export subsidies by the end of 2010), 
accommodating the EU's position. With respect to cotton, all forms of export subsidies 
were to be eliminated in 2006 with duty and quota-free access for LDCs' cotton. 
Secondly, on domestic support, greater cuts would be made in higher bands (higher levels 
of subsidies). Accordingly, the EU would embrace the highest cuts (top band), followed 
by the US and Japan (middle band), and the rest of the Members (bottom band). Thirdly, 
by April 30, 2006 progress on market access modalities was promised.281 
The April deadline lapsed without any meaningful US, EU or G-20 talks. On July 28, 
2006, the WTO General Council approved Director General Pascal Lamy's 
recommendation to suspend the Doha Round negotiation. 
4.3.4. Conclusion 
There are at least two questions to consider. The first is whether the course of the 
Doha Round is indicative of a bigger problem. Does this impasse mark the end of the 
WTO as an effective negotiating forum? The immediate defence is that current 
negotiations are more complex than in the past, firstly because the WTO now has many 
more members and secondly because the remaining barriers to trade are the hardest to 
tackle. C. Fred Bergsten is of the view that "behind-the-border distortions such as 
subsidies, raise more complex issues than do traditional tariffs and quotas,,282 If the WTO 
is not the right forum, an alternative forum able to drive the regime of multilateral 
281 The modalities are the template for determining eventualleveIs of reduction of trade barriers (tariffs and 
subsidies) both in agricultural and non-agricultural (industrial) sectors. 
282 C. Fred Bergsten, 'Rescuing the Doha Round' , Foreign Affairs Special Edition, December 2005. 
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liberalised trade will need to be created. So, despite the intransigence evident in the 
process of negotiation WTO members are unlikely to discard the present gains. The key 
actors, the United States and the European Union, face formidable domestic obstacles to 
making essential concessions than they did in the past. The regime of liberalized trade is 
yet to extend to agriculture and the process will not be immediate, but if countries feel 
that the WTO does not work they may be tempted to bypass it or ignore it. The likely 
result will be (A) big powers preferring to act unilaterally, (B) smaller powers acting in 
alliance, and/or (A) and (B) reaching bilateral agreements. 
This scenario, where the predictability and fairness of a rules-based system is replaced by 
an arbitrary one based on power, raises a second question based on the premise that the 
WTO is meant to have teeth: the rules based WTO should offer effective remedy even to 
the smallest of its members. The second question therefore is more interesting but more 
difficult to answer, and will form the basis of the discussion in the next section. Will 
developing countries shift from negotiation to litigation in dealing with developed 
countries' agricultural subsidies? 
4.4. The Cotton Case 
4.4.1. North and South 
Cotton figures as a significant export item for at least 20 of the 50 nations 
designated as least developed countries by the United Nations. In Central and West 
Africa, more than 10 million people depend directly on cotton production. Since the early 
1970s cotton production in the region has multiplied by five. About 95 per cent of the 
region's cotton is exported and is the main cash crop for a large section of the rural 
popUlation. Cotton is the major source Of foreign exchange and government revenue for 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Benin. According to the World Bank, the Central and West 
Africa region is among the lowest-cost producers of cotton in the world because of low 
labour costs and small plots. Despite this comparative advantage, it is losing world 
markets, and African cotton farmers are suffering rising poverty. According to Oxfam, an 
NOO, "lower world prices are transmitted to the poor in the form of reduced farm 
87 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
incomes, lower agricultural wages, and diminished provision of basic services.,,283 The 
countries balance of payment measures are exacerbated. 
Subsidies have helped make the United States the world's top cotton exporter, with more 
than 40 per cent of the world market. Cotton is one of the world's most heavily subsidized 
crops. According to US Department of Agriculture figures, American cotton exported at 
37 cents a pound in 2002 cost agricultural companies 86 cents to produce. The US 
government, underwritten by American taxpayers, made up the difference. During the 
2001/02 season, the US government paid more to its cotton farmers than the value of the 
harvested crop - $3.9 billion in subsidies for a crop valued at $3 billion. The only 
comparative advantage cotton growers in the US have is access to subsidies, without 
which they could not compete internationally.284 
Legislation passed in May 2002, increased the amount the government pays farmers. 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 provides an additional $83 billion 
in farm expenditure, above the $100 billion spent on existing programmes. Cotton 
growers are expected to receive an additional $2.5 billion annually during the next 6 
years. These cotton growers are mainly corporate agricultural companies. 
In 2003, partly due to the continuous flooding of the market by US cotton, world cotton 
prices fell to 42 cents per pound, far below the long-term average of 72 cents. The export 
subsidy programme, called Step 2, pays domestic users and exporters to buy US grown 
cotton whenever US cotton prices exceed world market prices. These subsidies thus 
guarantee a minimum price to US farmers - in 2004 at about 52 cents per pound-
regardless of what happens to world prices. Cotton production in the US grew by 42 per 
cent between 1998 and 2001 - oblivious to almost five years of depressed world prices. 
283 Oxfam International, Cultivating Poverty The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa. 
http://www.oxfam.orgieng/pdfs/pp02092S_cotton.pdf. (27 September 2002). 
284 Becker, Elizabeth (2004a) Looming Battles over Cotton Subsidies New York Times (24 January, 2004) 
Becker, Elizabeth (2004b) WTO Rules Against US on Cotton Subsidies New York Times (27 April, 2004) 
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The contrast between rich North and poor South is emphasized by Oxfam: "The 25,000 
cotton farmers in the US receive more in subsidies than the entire gross domestic product 
of Burkina Faso - one of the world's poorest countries, where more than 2 million 
people depend on cotton for their livelihood." 
4.4.2. Brazil's case before the WT0285 
In 2002, Brazil - a major cotton exporter - expressed its growing concerns 
about US cotton subsidies by initiating a WTO dispute settlement case (DS267) against 
specific provisions of the US cotton programme. The dispute concerns several US 
measures which Brazil alleged to be export subsidies in violation of the United States' 
obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture286, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement,,)287 and the GATT 1994.288 
Brazil's claim was that subsidies paid to US cotton farmers from 1999 to 2000 and those 
authorised in the Farm and Security Rural Investment Act of 2002 contravenes WTO 
rules. Brazil argued that the US was responsible for driving down world cotton prices, 
consequently causing harm to Brazilian farmers while increasing the US share of the 
global cotton market. In its case, Brazil estimated that US production would be 29 per 
cent lower and cotton prices would be 12.6 per cent higher in the absence of US 
subsidies. 
Brazil contended that US export and actionable subsidies provided from 1999-2002 
caused serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil in violation of Article 6.3( c) of the 
SCM Agreement.289 Brazil also contended that these subsidies give the United States 
285 United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton-Report of the Panel (WT/DS267/R) (September 8,2004) 
286 Accessed online http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/l4-ag.pdf 
287 Accessed online http://www . wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm. pdf 
288 Accessed online http://www . wto.org/english/docs_e/legaLe/06-gatt. pdf 
289 Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement provides that serious prejudice within the meaning of Article S(c) 
may arise in any case where the effect of the subsidy is "significant price suppression ... in the same 
market." 
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more than an equitable share of world exports of upland cotton in violation of Articles 
XVI:l and XVI:3 ("Additional provisions on export subsidies") of the GATT 1994.290 
The Cotton Four (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) 
The African cotton producers were third parties to the case. The four West African 
countries had called for the end to cotton subsidies of all WTO member countries through 
the so-called "Cotton Initiative" launched prior to the Ministerial meeting in Cancun in 
2003. The four countries proposed in the agriculture negotiations the "Sectoral Initiative 
in Favour of Cotton" with effect that the EU and the US should embark on a three-year 
phase-out of cotton subsidies. An annex, "Draft Decision Concerning Specific Measures 
in Favour of Cotton with a View to Poverty Alleviation" was added at the Ministerial 
Conference so that in the meantime, transitional mechanisms to offset the losses incurred 
would be set.291 These countries were not asking for preferences, but for a correction of 
trade distortions. 
4.4.3. The Panel Report292 
On September 8, 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled against the United 
States on several key issues. The Panel noted that the US was the world's largest exporter 
of upland cotton during the marketing years 1999 to 2002. It also found that, according to 
the record evidence, the United States' share of world exports increased from 
approximately 23.5 per cent in 1999 to 24.5 per cent in 2000 to 37.3 per cent in 2001 to 
39.9 per cent in 2002. In comparison, the Panel noted that Brazil's share of world 
production of upland cotton was approximately 3.8 to 5 per cent from 1999 to 2002, 
while Brazil's share of world exports of upland cotton never exceeded 2.4 per cent in the 
same period. The Panel concluded that, due to the large relative proportion of the United 
290 "Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary 
products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates 
to increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a 
manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in 
that product, account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during 
a previous representative period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such 
trade in the product." (Article XVI:3) 
291 Accessed online http://www.wto.org/Englishltratop_e/agric_e/cotton_subcommittee_e.htm 
292 (WTlDS2671R). International Law in Brief: Developments in international law, prepared by the Editorial 
Staff of International Legal Materials. The American Society of International Law September 21, 2004. 
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States production and export of upland cotton, the United States exerted a substantial 
proportionate influence on prices in the world market for upland cotton. 
The Panel noted that US support for cotton during the period between 1999-2002 
averaged $3.28 billion per year, well above the $2 billion that was provided to cotton 
farmers in 1992. The Panel also found that US programs for cotton under the Farm and 
Security Rural Investment Act of 2002 did not meet the requirements for exemption 
under Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The US failed to meet the requirement 
that such support not exceed 1992 spending levels. The Panel concluded that the U.S. 
price-contingent subsidies provided to U.S. cotton farmers between 1999 and 2002 
caused serious prejudice to Brazilian competitors. 
4.4.4. The Appeaz293 
On 18 October 2004 the United States notified the DSB of its decision to appeal 
the Panel report. On 3 March 2005, a WTO Appellate Body upheld the Panel's ruling on 
appeal. The Appellate Body (AB) upheld all major findings of the Panel that ruled that 
US cotton subsidies were in violation of WTO rules on agriculture and subsidies. The AB 
agreed with the panel that the 'export credit guarantees' and 'step 2 marketing payments' 
offered to US cotton producers were prohibited export subsidies. The AB recommended 
in March 2005 that the United States remove certain "prohibited subsidies" by 21 July 
2005, and remove the adverse effects resulting from certain "actionable subsidies" by 21 
September 2005. 
4.4.5. Effect: Adjustments and retaliation 
On 21 March 2005, the Panel and AB reports were adopted by the WTO 
membership. The WTO ruled that in the case brought by Brazil and cotton-producing 
companies from West Africa, the USA's cotton export subsidy program violated the 
WTO agreement on subsidies. Under dispute settlement rules, the US was expected to 
bring its policies into line with the panel's recommendations or negotiate a mutually 
293 (WT/DS267/ABIR) 
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acceptable settlement with Brazil. In June 2005, the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) complied with part of the ruling that did not need Congressional approval. 294 
When the US failed to meet the deadline of 1 July 2005 to remove the prohibited export 
subsidies, Brazil claimed the right to retaliate against $3 billion in US exports to Brazil 
based on the prohibited subsidies, and proposed $1 billion in retaliation based on the 
actionable subsidies. Brazil's request for authorization from the WTO to impose 
countermeasures met with American objections to the retaliation amounts. The US 
requested WTO arbitration on the matter. However, on 18 August 2005 the two parties 
reached a procedural agreement to temporarily suspend retaliation proceedings.295 
In February 2006 the US House of Representatives approved legislation that would repeal 
the support programme.296 This was consistent with the development goals of the Doha 
Development agenda, which calls for developed countries to eliminate all forms of export 
subsidies for cotton in 2006. The end of the Step 2 programme in August 2006 meant 
that the United States had began to comply with a portion of the AB 's rulings. But in 
August 21, 2006, Brazil submitted a request for a WTO compliance panel to review 
whether there was full compliance with the panel and AB rulings. The US blocked the 
DSB from approving Brazil's request. According to the Congressional Research Service 
"additional permanent modifications to US farm programs may still be needed to fully 
comply with the WTO ruling on "actionable subsidies.,,297 
4.4.6. Conclusions 
This is the first formal challenge to the North's agricultural subsidies in the WTO. 
Brazil's former deputy agriculture minister Pedro de Camargo Neto was quoted: 
"Negotiation is better than litigation, but the fact that the US is not moving on domestic 
294 Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 2005. 
295 (WTlDS267/25) 
296 'Congress Approves Legislation Repealing Cotton Subsidy Program' USTR Press Releases, 1 February 
2006. 
297 Randy Schnepf, 'U.S. Agricultural Policy Response To WTO Cotton Decision,' Congressional 
Research Service, September 8, 2006. 
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agricultural subsidies in the Doha round means that bringing a WTO case may help to 
push the talks along. " 
The economic adviser at the Brazilian Embassy in Washington explained to reporters: 
"You have to understand we are fed up with these farm subsidies and hearing for 25 
years that things will get better. The only way to deal with it is to turn this into a make-it-
b k · .. ,,298 or- rea -It propositIOn. 
The cotton victory is significant, as it shows that the dispute settlement 'route' can be 
used against to enforce WTO rules. Furthermore, this also points to a situation where 
smaller countries can cooperate and thus have the possibility of redressing serious trade 
disputes with much larger countries through WTO litigation when WTO negotiations 
alone fail. The decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement system can be expected to be 
critical in influencing future subsidy challenges. 
Another aspect is the influence of this and any future rulings on the negotiations. Though 
the Doha Round talks were suspended indefinitely on July 2006 developing countries 
may use the ruling to advance developing country interests. This strengthens the case for 
the reduction and elimination of developed country subsidies and puts the pressure on the 
developed countries in the current round of negotiations. 
More specifically the cotton case is an example of sector specific collaboration. By 
banding together cotton producers have cooperated according to their producer interest 
rather than merely their regional or bloc interests. This shows a likely shift away from 
solely political factors to more pragmatic economic alliances in cooperation. 
29X Becker, Elizabeth (2004a) 'Looming Battles over Cotton Subsidies' New York Times (24 January 2004) 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION: Cooperation Theory and Prospects 
This Chapter begins with a summary of the research, starting with the problem 
statement, research question and the principal results of this dissertation. Section 2 
discusses what lessons can be learned from this research. Finally, section 3 focuses on the 
implications of these findings in the context of the literature and presents some 
conclusions relevant to the study of international relations. 
5.1. 
At the outset of this dissertation a number of questions about international 
institutions, about the rules under which they operate, and their origins and evolution, 
prompted a closer analysis of the institutions governing international trade relations 
between states. The approach to this complex area was from the perspective of 
developing countries, the South. Of particular interest was whether there was evidence of 
cooperation by these states of the south, and questions of 'How they define and pursue 
their interests?' And 'How they influence or are constrained by international 
institutions?' This made it necessary to follow a historical and comparative methodology 
and ask 'Why and how do changes to the institution influence the competitive and 
cooperative behaviour of its members?' The fundamental change to be observed was the 
extent to which the international system has moved away from being a power-based 
system to one that is law-based. 
The Rationale for this study is straightforward. As the trade relations (like most interstate 
relations) over time become more rule-based and thus more institutionalised the 
expectation is that 'weaker' but equally sovereign states can and will use those 
institutional provisions available to them to their advantage. If this is the case, it should 
be primarily in areas where conflicting interests are predominant that evidence in support 
can be found. This presents therefore the need to look at the provisions of the trade 
regime that regulate the resolution of disputes between states party, and, also at those 
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topics that are currently contentious, namely those affecting state relations in agriculture 
trade. 
The Research Question is thus set out in three parts. The first, asks: What effect has 
'legalising' (understood as formalising in law and institutions) international trade 
relations, under (l) the GATT and under (2) the WTO, had on states of the South? The 
second and third parts provide analysis in looking at firstly, how states have been able to 
advance their aims of economic development in each of the GATT and WTO regimes, 
and secondly how the change in the regime has influenced the way in which states of the 
South cooperate. 
A comparative methodology was used. The power-based relations under GATT (1947-
1994) were compared to the rule-based relations of the WTO (1995-2005). The norms, 
principles, rules and decision-making structures of each regime were compared. The 
historical approach is necessary to compare and understand the important changes to the 
regime over time. The focus was on the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations, especially 
as they referred to the norms that provide the foundation of the regime. Norms were seen 
as the general obligations that guide states' behaviour in designing decision-making 
procedures and in implementing rules. 299 The North-South issues under GATT and under 
the WTO are compared, especially as it regards a development norm. By investigating the 
evolution of the norms and rules of trade relations over time, the concept of international 
regime provided the basis of comparison to explore continuity and change in the political 
economy. 
The theoretical context of this study centres on how the realist (power) and liberal 
(institutionalist) scholars seek to explain the international trade regime. The Realist 
primacy of the state means cooperation is explained as the convergence of self-interest, 
whether states enter a temporary alliance or accept a more permanent organization. Thus 
any international organization can only be as effective as the most powerful states permit 
them to be. But, even if one accepts the existence of anarchy as predominant, structural 
299 Finalyson and Zacher 1983: 276. 
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anarchy does not mean that international politics is only characterized by conflict. States 
do cooperate with one another and do create rules and institutions in many areas. These 
theoretical implications are considered in detail in the final section. 
The result of the study is based on the finding that the international institutions affect the 
decisions states make. The options open to states participating in a regime are limited by 
the norms, principles and rules of the institutions to specific types of decisions and 
actions. 
The analysis shows that states are constrained by the possible remedy institutions are able 
to offer. The GAIT offered only limited remedy, so states looked outside the regime to 
UNCTAD and the NIEO. In contrast, the dispute settlement system of the WTO regime 
offers states a legal or judicial route (though international law has its limitations) that 
GA IT did not. To date, under the WTO regime there are modest but significant victories 
for states of the South, and the case brought by Brazil against American subsidies on 
cotton production is presented as an illustrative example. 
5.2. 
The questions, and the structure followed by this thesis in answering them, are 
represented schematically in the table below. As noted, this inquiry asks: Do the changes 
to the institutions governing trade present those states with new policy choices? Two 
aspects were considered: First, the 'Agenda-setting' capability of states; second, the use 
of formal dispute settlement procedures. In this context, the study considered whether the 
creation of the WTO has led to more effective multilateral cooperation on trade issues 
between states of the South, than was the case during GATT. A key finding is that the 
WTO mechanism allows for significant change in the type of choices, decisions and 
behaviour that states of the South can engage in their international trade relations. These 
are discussed below. 
96 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
What effect has 'legalising' (formalising in law/institutions) international trade relations 
(under I.GATT and II.WTO) had on states of the South? 
-In their cooperation? -In advancing their aims of economic development? 
QUESTIONS CASE I CASE II Why? 
(Chapter 2) (Chapter 3) (Chapter 4) (Chapter 5) 
Literature Review THE GATT THEWTO COOPERA TION of 
And Theory REGIME REGIME the SOUTH 
Effect of 'legalising' Power-based Rule-based Legalization-order. 
(formalising in relations of the relations of the States options are 
law/institutions) GATT (1947- WTO (1995-2005) constrained by the 
Anarchy-order 1994) possible remedy 
dichotomy? institutions can offer 
In their cooperation? The North-South The North-South North-South groups 
(Economic issues under issues under WTO like Cairns group 
development) GATT 
Foreign policy Doha Development South-South groups 
choices? The NIEO Agenda like the G-20 
Effectiveness of Outside Inside institutions, Producer groups. 
multilateral institutions, The DSU offers Brazil (+4) against 
cooperation on trade UNCTAD and the legal or quasi- American subsidies on 
Issues NIEO judicial route cotton production 
5.2.1. The North-South issues under WTO 
Before: A North-South face-off in advancing economic development. 
Now: South-South unity and cooperation in advancing economic development 
The realization that individually states of the South were unable to exert 
significant influence on the international system and its institutions prompted an increase 
in their cooperation. The collective identity of 'developing country', and the political 
routes taken to bring about this Third World solidarity, has been an important aspect of 
international relations. It is particularly the emphasis on the economic development of 
these countries that has united them at the international level. In advancing this aim they 
have met with some degree of success. For example, a development orientation has 
become standard in most international forums, and dominates the agenda of many of the 
international organizations. At the WTO especially, the economic needs of developing 
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countries is a primary concern and is seen as crucial to the current negotiations of the 
Doha Development Round. In the words of the Doha Declaration, (paragraph 2), the 
developing countries hope to "secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development". 
It would be wrong to deduce that since 'development' is now to be found at the top of the 
agenda that this represents some kind of victory for the South. As the historical approach 
used here has shown, the needs of developing countries have not always been paramount 
and indeed in the first two decades of GATT the concerns of these states seem to be 
negligible to the success of the various negotiations. As Chapter 3 explains, the GATT 
regime had since its origin certain institutional flaws that, although provided the 
framework for tariff reductions, did little else to extend benefits to the agriculturally 
dependent countries of the South. Despite the GATT norms of non-discrimination and 
reciprocity, the absence of a system of dispute resolution that could protect their interests 
meant that the politically powerful always dominated the GAIT talks. In particular, by 
excluding agriculture trade from a free trade regime the protection of this sector where 
countries of the south would have enjoyed a comparative advantage, the protectionist 
impulses of Northern producers went unchecked. This scene was complicated by the 
special and differential treatment enjoyed by some developing countries by virtue of 
arrangements concluded with their ex-colonial masters, and which was denied to others. 
The developing countries' signatory to GATT could exert little pressure multilaterally 
and not surprisingly, played only a small role initially. 
The GAIT then was unable to provide the institutional setting for the reforms that these 
states pursued. It was therefore primarily through UNCTAD that attempts to reform and 
restructure the world economy were pursued, and that the 'right to development' was 
given wider currency. This attempt to restructure the world economy had some results 
that were positive politically, but less clearly so in economic terms.300 The G77 and the 
NAM were influential in building political solidarity, as seen in the move in the early 
300 The benefits of an open economy, and the cost of a closed economy, are now among the most widely 
shared canons of economic orthodoxy. 
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1970s towards a NIEO. Economically, many of the demands were at odds with the liberal 
orientation of free trade, and UNCTAD's reforms such as the validation of domestic 
protection for import-substitution strategies and a generalized system of preferences, 
were diametrically the opposite of what GATT's reciprocity principle required. SDT 
legitimised the argument for avoiding liberalisation, leaving developing countries outside 
the dynamic of the world system. By seeking to deviate from GATT rules, and 
succeeding in driving the new institutional structures such as UNCT AD, states of the 
south found that cooperation for their collective interest was best found outside the rather 
than within the GATT regime. 
The period of transition came as North-South tensions escalated, and the face-off at the 
UN General Assembly in 1974 and 1975 can be considered a turning point. Not only was 
the demand for a NIEO badly received and criticized for being too radical, it also exposed 
the shortcomings of a solidarity that was based on broad principles and a long-list of 
urgent reforms, which provided no real basis for negotiation. How can the G77 and the 
economic vision of a NIEO be assessed? For one, it demonstrated the capacity for 
diplomatic cooperation by States of the South. But the lesson for policy makers is that it 
is hard to derive a consensus position in complex international policy matters, when these 
require trade-offs between competing values. With countries of vastly differing levels of 
interest and expertise operating together, such as the G77, maintaining common positions 
in negotiations is difficult. The search for agreement required a more pragmatic approach, 
such as through the Integrated Program for Commodities and the Lome Convention. The 
strategy of the G77 was based on the assumption that concessions could only be wrested 
from the rich countries through collective action by developing countries. The necessary 
implication was that this collective action would be through UNCT AD rather than the 
GATT. 
As trade flows moved beyond commodities and manufactured goods to services, and as 
trade barriers were seen no longer simply as tariff barriers, the need to improve the 
GATT became apparent. There was however a fundamental change taking place, the 
creation of a global economy, for which GATT was not specifically geared. This 
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prompted the inclusion at the beginning of the eighth round of GAIT of a special 
negotiation on the 'functioning of the GATT system' (or FOGS). This in turn led to the 
creation of the WTO at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which would provide not 
only new areas under regulation, such as agriculture which was of interest to the states of 
the south, but would also provide the legal basis for international trade relations. 
That the WTO is the international organization dealing with global trade rules has meant 
that is seen also as having a primary responsibility for global development. This 
expectation, that the WTO can deal with broader issues that include the environment, 
employment, investment, culture and the development needs of the poorest nations, 
places more responsibility on the organization that it may be expected to handle. The idea 
of the Doha Development Agenda, of promoting justice and development beyond trade 
interests, appears to have been broadly accepted but not possible to implement. Unlike 
the NIEO however these are ideas prominent within the WTO regime. 
It is important to note that these historical developments in the regime trace a 
continuation of the main principles of GATT under the WTO. As Chapter 4 notes, the 
substantial change to the regime is that the institutional foundations are explicitly set out 
and that the adjudication of trade disputes follows a legal rather than diplomatic process. 
These developments were also fruitfully explored via the theory of neoliberal 
institutionalism that posits that the increase in economic and other forms of 
interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. As an 
economy with global linkages emerges, the institutions capable of providing oversight 
and regulation are created, and these have as their founding principle some recognition 
under international law. This should be no surprise. As Deborah Cass makes clear, 
"historically the development of international law itself runs parallel with the growth of 
international trade and commerce.,,301 
This legal aspect, where states have duties and responsibilities arising from the treaty 
obligations under the WTO, has re-characterised the North-South playing field. 
301 Cass, 2005: 16. 
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5.2.2. Multilateral cooperation on trade issues 
Before: A broad South alliance outside GATT, via UNCTAD, NAM and the NIEO 
Now: Producer groups like "Brazil (+4),' against American subsidies on cotton work 
inside institutions where the WTO DSM offers legal or quasi-judicial route 
The WTO DSM aims to resolve trade quarrels between members. Such 
mechanism has always been present throughout the GAITIWTO history, but, only since 
the Uruguay Round, benefited from a genuine adjudicative approach. Article XXII of the 
GAIT, entitled 'Consultation' establishes the procedures for resolution and emphasises 
that it is negotiation and diplomacy rather than litigation that is the GATT's modus 
operandi. Unlike in the GAIT years, the new WTO maintains that "right perseveres over 
might". The WTO, in comparison, is a more legalistic, rule-oriented approach. The key 
change under the WTO is that Panel or Appellate Body reports are automatically 
adopted, except where the Dispute Settlement Body decides by consensus not to adopt 
the report, thus breaking with the underlying diplomatic nature of the GATT. 
There is more to this new approach to disputes than is immediately apparent. As this 
study has shown, though the disputes are mainly about the infringement of obligations 
under the WTO agreements, the implications of the Panel Reports on the ongoing 
multilateral negotiations are also worthy of consideration. What this means is that the 
different views advanced by North or South in the negotiations themselves can be 
strengthened (or weakened) by recourse to the WTO dispute settlement and its binding 
decisions. 
When looking at the history of the WTO negotiations, the inclusion of agriculture and the 
Agreement of Agriculture are a significant step. While there has been negotiation on 
agriculture, and subsequently agreements to be implemented, this has not meant that there 
are fewer disputes in this area. The three pillars of market access, domestic support and 
export subsidies are new obligations whose novelty lies not in their nature but in the fact 
that they seek to extend the regime's market oriented rules to new products. The recent 
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events, where continued developed world agricultural protection is seen to be debilitating 
the development of the South, have been stumbling blocks to the successful completion 
of the Doha Round of negotiations. Whereas under the GAIT regime no provision was 
made for a ruling, the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism permits for litigation, which 
can, in effect, allow the opportunity for advance where negotiation has deadlocked. 
The deadlock in the Doha Round, most clearly evident at the failure of the Cancun 
Ministerial in 2003, brought to the surface the tensions created by the apparent 
recalcitrance of the North to adhere to the Agreement on Agriculture. While there is still 
evidence that the South can maintain unity, and create coalitions such as the G20 to best 
express it, this study has shown that the parallel track opened up by the Cotton Case may 
best represent a successful outcome for agricultural producers of the South. Though the 
ruling against American subsidies on cotton does not win the war, it is nevertheless a 
significant battle. The fact that the WTO regime offers protection via litigation is another 
weapon in the armoury of the South. This is made even more relevant by the fact that it 
represents a new type of cooperation. 
The Cotton Case is an example of cooperation but not in the same way that the NIEO 
was. It represents rather a sector specific collaboration. Under the leadership of Brazil, 
clearly a leader of the global South, cotton producers from African nations that 
individually would not have had the means to bring the case to the WTO were able to 
cooperate in building an alliance of Third World cotton producers. The fact that this was 
the first time that an African country participated in the dispute settlement process is in 
itself a milestone, but the fact that four African countries were collaborating as cotton 
producers rather than merely an amorphous 'South' may be most notable result. The 
conclusion thus reached is that this 'parallel track' shows what is possibly a likely shift 
from broad, and essentially political alliances to pragmatic alliances based on sector 
specific producers. 
There is the danger that in time the illustrative example of the cotton producers signifies 
not a successful beginning for this type of producer collaboration but rather an anomaly. 
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Without venturing into speculation there are no easy answers. There are still however at 
least three main problems with accepting this WTO decision as indicative of a new form 
of cooperation in international trade.302 The first is that countries may be pressured out of 
bringing complaints for fear of retaliation or an adverse response in some bilateral 
agreement. The second is that countries may turn a blind eye to foreign indiscretions, if 
they wish to adopt similar behaviour themselves. Hypothetically, while they may want to 
challenge a particular subsidy on the basis of legal argument, if successful, it would 
undermine its own prohibited subsidy programmes. The third observation is that leaving 
rights to nation-states themselves will obviously not result in any country challenging its 
own behaviour. 
This points to the wider problem characterised by the swinging pendulum between 
anarchy and order or power and law in international relations, and the next section now 
considers the implication in the theoretical context. Put simply, despite what conclusions 
are reached from the example under consideration, a truly judicial mechanism will not be 
set up at the international economic level without fully redefining Member States' 
sovereignty. 
5.2.3. The effect of 'legalising' trade relations and the anarchy-order dichotomy: 
States are constrained by the institutions they create 
The WTO and GATT originated in international agreements between sovereign 
nation-states. The philosophical underpinning of the international system has been the 
acceptance of the paramount rights of sovereign nations.303 States retain full economic 
freedom, except where these rights have been constrained through recognised 
developments in international law. Where commerce and trade are concerned, any 
limitation to those sovereign rights is generally established consensually through treaty. 
The pro-sovereignty bias of the GATT-WTO system is seen also by the accepted process 
of decision-making within the system. All key decisions under GATT, including the 
302 There is another argument, not considered here, that there is a tendency for governments to be captured 
by vested interests when deciding which actions to bring. 
303 For example, art 2( 1) of the United Nations Charter recognises that every state is sovereign and equal. 
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adoption of Panel reports on disputes, have almost always been reached on a consensus 
basis. Historically, new rules have been developed and disputes resolved only with the 
consensus of each of the participating contracting parties. Where international economic 
law is concerned, the GATT - WTO system has been unique, particularly in terms of its 
development and utilisation of a binding Dispute Settlement Mechanism.304 
This new scenario is one where an arbitrary system based on power is replaced by the 
predictability and fairness of a rule-based system. The rule-based WTO should offer 
effective remedy even to the smallest of its members. But can international law, or more 
precisely an international legal regime on trade issues, do all that it says it can? It is in the 
ability (or inability) to exercise remedial and coercive powers that the WTO system 
should be measured. In the majority of cases the Reports merely call for the measures in 
dispute to be brought into conformity with WTO obligations. This study has shown that it 
is the inability to enforce awards that places considerable limits on the effectiveness of a 
regime's legal power. 
Nevertheless, judging by use made of the WTO DSM so far, it is clear that this 
mechanism represents a significant development. For one, there have to date been as 
many cases subject to dispute settlement as there were in the fifty years of the GATT. 
Secondly, developing countries have been more active in WTO dispute settlement.305 
With greater recourse to multilateral dispute settlement, developing countries' 
participation has increased. Developing countries, especially ill served by GATT's 
diplomacy, are better poised to benefit from the WTO's more legalistic architecture. 
5.3. 
The theoretical context of this study centres on how the realist (power) and 
liberal (institutionalist) approaches seek to explain the international trade regime. While it 
is not necessary to adopt a polarized view of a binary between realism and idealism, this 
:104 See 'Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes' 
:105 Lacarte-Muro, 1., and Gappah P. International Trade, Developing Countries and the WTO Legal and 
Dispute Settlement System: a view from the bench. Journal of International Economic Law. 2000, 3(3), 
395-401. 
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was more useful in a comparative study than broadly Marxist, mercantilist or liberal 
starting points. These traditional perspectives accounted for the actions of the most 
powerful, under the concept of hegemony, but were unable to give a proper theoretical 
account of countries of the South as other than passive or unwilling participants in the 
international economy. Liberal philosophy, ostensibly the basis for the regime of free 
trade and the post-l 945 international order, was of greater explanatory value. The 
hegemon's role in establishing a regime is however less important here than the 
maintenance and continuation ofthe regime after hegemony. The focus on 
interdependence - and the institutions created to manage it - makes a neo-liberal or 
liberal institutionalist approach most relevant to the study of multilateral relations. 
Areas of study considered were firstly the foundation of an international society of states 
under anarchy and secondly the causal impact of interdependence on state relations. 
Empirical observation reveals the proliferation of formal institutions for international 
cooperation, with their basis on generally agreed principles of international law. To recap 
the theory, the Realist primacy of the state means cooperation is explained as the 
convergence of self-interest, whether states enter a temporary alliance or accept a more 
permanent organization. Thus any international organization can only be as effective as 
the most powerful states permit them to be. From the perspective of liberal theory, even if 
one were to accept the existence of anarchy as predominant, structural anarchy does not 
mean that international politics is characterized by conflict. As neo-liberal theorists 
explain, states do cooperate with one another and, in many areas, do create rules and 
institutions. 
The distinction that domestic policy requires a level of legitimacy while in foreign policy 
any means can be used to achieve the ends is no longer readily accepted as always true. 
As economic and political integration creates high levels of interdependence, the effect is 
a blurring of the domestic order with the international one. With increasing 
interdependence evident there has also been the perceived disintegration of state 
sovereignty. The hypothesis advanced in this thesis is that an increase in economic and 
other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among 
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states, but that this cooperation when carried out legitimately under law does not 
neutralise or undermine sovereignty. The conclusion is that there can be a greater 
emphasis on the importance of law as an explanatory factor in the analysis of state 
behayiour in the international system. 
The binding legal effects of treaties and how much leeway a state may choose to exercise 
in complying or not complying to its obligations remains a central question. Louis 
Henkin, in answering the question of how nations behave was of the view that "almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time,,306 For the most part, states perceive compliance to be 
in their own self interest. 
The theoretical aspects of this study have made only a modest contribution to the ongoing 
debate. The starting point, utilizing some of the tools of international political economy 
particularly regime analysis, proved fruitful in providing a framework for comparison. 
The conclusion is that this set of tools has not kept pace with the development in 
economics and international law. There is considerable overlap between international 
relations and international law. An interdisciplinary approach is useful in the study of 
organized international cooperation. 
The evolution of the regime towards one that is characterized as rule-based was borne out 
in Chapters 3 and 4 and is a significant conclusion. The transformation of the GATT 
dispute resolution process from one that relies principally on political negotiation to a 
much more formal legal process in which the disputants present claims before a binding 
third party tribunal, can be seen as the 'judicialization' of international trade relations. 
The role of international dispute resolution has been shown as an important new 
institutional aspect of the WTO and one that wil1likely become more prominent in future. 
Deborah Cass' observation is valid, "historically the development of international law 
itself runs parallel with the growth of international trade and commerce.,,307 
306 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, 1968. 
307 Cass, 2005: 16. 
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The comparative historical aspects of this study introduced the shortcomings perceived in 
the GAIT regime and how they caused the developing countries to seek exceptions and 
special treatment. As Chapter 3 shows, the states of the South were constrained by the 
possible remedy offered by the GATT institution, and, since the GAIT could not advance 
their interest sufficiently, it was outside the GAIT that their cooperation on trade issues 
advanced. This was seen primarily via UNCTAD and in the NIEO. As noted in the 
conclusion to that chapter, the initial apparent success of building Third World solidarity 
did not materialize into successfully launching a new international economic order. The 
failure of the NIEO may have been caused by its over-ambitious demands, but its 
significance can nevertheless be seen in that it did herald an acceptance that the rights and 
duties of states applied to the economic and not just the political sphere. In the broader 
analysis regarding the development of international law in development, these events also 
show that any legal rules, constraining and modifying state power, are not generally 
subject to change solely in response to fluctuations in the immediate interests of states. 
The NIEO was thus largely a normative effort, around which South coalesced. 
As explored in Chapter 4, there is rather both a longer time frame and a transnational 
legal process necessary in order to build institutions and establish a legal order. This 
Chapter therefore focused firstly on the process of the Uruguay Round, and, secondly, as 
regards agriculture, the importance of interpretation through the WTO DSU system and 
the precedents created. The principal finding is that much institutionalised cooperation 
has now taken an increasingly 'legalized' or 'judicialized' form, that is, one that depends 
increasingly on legal dispute mechanisms. 
This is not to say that coalition building is not still the main way that developing 
countries negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Indeed Chapter 4 explained how the 
G20 alliance has redefined a North-South face-off, but nevertheless the success of the 
G20's blocking or defensive posture, though perhaps too early to call, does not compare 
to the success of the legal action initiated on cotton subsidies. Developing country 
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success in using the WTO's judicial instruments shows the causal impact of legal rules, 
institutions and processes on actors and actions. 
This conclusion is consistent with the view that legal rules constrains state behaviour by 
forming the basis on which actions must be justified, decision making authorized, and 
determining the institutional structures within which political decisions are reached. It 
would however be prudent to offer some qualification and not to deny the importance of 
power and self-interest in international politics, or International Relations approaches 
based on these. As is often pointed out, treaties are in large measure the expression of 
conditions and relationships at the time of their making and cannot freeze forever the 
status quo prevailing at any particular moment in time. As conditions alter, there is still 
no agency with power to adjudicate the breach of the treaty or prevent recourse to war. 
Thus power is the great regulator of relations among states. However, the respect for 
international law has been greatest under conditions of stability and of broad agreement 
about legitimate aims, as is the case in the period under consideration here. A common 
law of international trade might threaten the sovereignty of nation states. From the 
perspective of some WTO members that threat is already evident. Of course, that threat is 
also an opportunity for an enhanced international legal order. 
The starting point in reviewing the literature and assessing the key arguments in 
international political economy was the question about the nature of the international 
system of states, evaluating the realist and liberal emphasis on anarchy and order 
respectively. From this the different theoretical perspectives traced the role of the state, 
analysing the tensions between autonomy and interdependence, and concluding that the 
interaction of economic and political factors are a necessary in contemporary study. The 
focus of this study, the creation of the international order, followed the literature on 
hegemony and regimes and found that neither fully captures the causal impact of changes 
to institutions. Therefore the study of international order and an international trade regime 
was considered in terms of neoliberal institutionalism and studies from the perspective of 
international law. 308 Robert Keohane's work as the most prominent International 
,os Antecedents can be found in the British School and the work of Hedley Bull. 
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Relations scholar in what can be called institutionalist research was central. Like these 
theorists, this thesis is interested in the form of international institutions, or rather, the 
difference that form makes. 
Whether states in future will resist the waning of their autonomy by manipulating 
arrangements to maximise their own interests, or whether states will accept and formalise 
institutionalised co-operation remains an open question. By looking particularly at the 
context of dispute resolution this study hopes to contribute to others considering the 
development of the international trade regime and to those looking at issues of 
importance to countries of the South. 
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EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
1990, 2000, and 2005 
(millions of dollars) (b-incIudes WTO estimates)309 
1990 2000 2005 
World 414723 World 552989 World 
United States European Union (25) 
European Union 
I 59404 I 229313 I (25) 
2 Canada 22339 2 intra-EU (25) 173280 2 intra-EU (25) 
3 Australia 11628 3 United States 71408 3 extra-EU (25) 
4 China 10060 4 extra-EU (25) 56033 4 United States 
5 Brazil 9779 5 Canada 34789 5 Canada 
6 Thailand 7786 6 Australia 16446 6 Brazil 
7 Malaysia 7500 7 China 16384 7 China 
8 Argentina 7482 8 Brazil 15467 8 Australia 
9 New Zealand 5966 9 Thailand 12242 9 Argentina 
10 Hong Kong, China 4556 10 Argentina 11933 10 Thailand 
11 Indonesia 4154 11 Mexico 9100 11 Russian Federation 
12 Singapore 4095 12 Malaysia 8015 12 Indonesia 
13 re-exports 3735 13 Russian Federation 7764 13 Malaysia 
14 Taipei, Chinese 3732 14 Indonesia 7764 14 New Zealand 
15 India (b) 3506 15 New Zealand 7642 15 Mexico 
16 Mexico 3466 16 India (b) 6401 16 India (b) 
17 Turkey 3300 17 Chile 6399 17 Chile 
18 Japan 3298 18 Hong Kong, China 5693 18 Turkey 
19 Norway 3077 19 re-exports 5240 19 Japan 
20 Korea, Republic 2985 20 Japan 4395 20 Norway 
Appendix 1 
309 Exports of agricultural products of selected economies, 1990-05, International Trade Statistics WTO 
2006. (http://www.wto.org/englishlres_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_bysector_e.htm) 
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Exports of agricultural products310 (2000 and 2005) 
10 Biggest exporters as % of world total 
Value (m dollars) (%) 
2000 World 552989 100.0 
1 European Union (25) 229313 41.5 
2 United States 71408 12.9 
3 Canada 34789 6.3 
4 Australia 16446 3.0 
5 China 16384 3.0 
6 Brazil 15467 2.8 
7 Thailand 12242 2.2 
8 Argentina 11933 2.2 
9 Mexico 9100 1.6 
10 Malaysia 8015 1.4 
2005 World 851847 100.0 
1 European Union (25) 369708 43.4 
2 United States 82674 9.7 
3 Canada 41178 4.8 
4 Brazil 35039 4.1 
5 China 28711 3.4 
6 Australia 21209 2.5 
7 Argentina 19182 2.3 
8 Thailand 17816 2.1 
9 Russian Federation 14874 1.7 
10 Indonesia 14320 1.7 
Appendix 2 
:l10 'Exports of agricultural products of selected economies, 1990-05', International Trade Statistics WTO 
2006. Also at (http://www.wto.org/englishlres_e/statis_e/its2006_elits06_bysectoce.htm) 
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Exports of agricultural products311 (2000 and 2005) 
Share in economy's total merchandise exports, Ranked by percentage change 
Decreasing importance of Agriculture trade 
2000 2005 % Change 
1 Guatemala 60.2 37.1 -23.0 
2 Kenya (b) 61.3 45.6 -15.6 
3 Tanzania (b) 65.2 52.3 -12.9 
4 Zimbabwe (b) 59.6 46.9 -12.7 
5 Viet Nam (b) 27.4 17.9 -9.5 
6 Peru 27.2 18.4 -8.8 
7 Chile 33.3 24.9 -8.4 
8 Ecuador 39.5 31.2 -8.3 
9 Iceland 66.1 59.4 -6.7 
10 Cote d'Ivoire (b) 59.4 52.8 -6.6 
11 Nicaragua 84.8 78.9 -6.0 
12 Australia 25.7 20.0 -5.7 
13 Kazakhstan (b) 8.2 2.9 -5.3 
14 Moldova 62.9 58.8 -4.1 
15 India (b) 14.1 10.1 -4.1 
16 China 6.6 3.8 -2.8 
17 Turkey 13.8 11.0 -2.8 
18 Romania 8.0 5.3 -2.7 
19 Serbia and Montenegro 22.6 20.1 -2.4 
20 Colombia 23.7 21.6 -2.1 
(b-includes WTO estimates) 
Appendix 3 
311 'Exports of agricultural products of selected economies, 1990-05', International Trade Statistics WTO 
2006. Also at (http://www.wto.org/englishlres_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_bysectoce.htm) 
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